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ABSTRACT
There exists a high degree of uncertainty as to the boundaries and role of risk
in the framework of contract law. This uncertainty exists even in the context of
insurance law where the subject of the contract is necessarily the commodity of
risk. While risk has been probed and examined as a matter of business strategy by
several prominent studies and by experts who have catalogued human thought
regarding risk, risk has not been the subject of systematic examination in the legal
sphere. What follows is a reexamination of how we deal with the concept of risk
within insurance law. My aim is to show that an insured's behavior, the notion of
risk, and basic insurance law doctrine are all related
I begin by analyzing how general contract law has handled risk and note the
limitations of contract law as applied to insurance due to its core: risk. Next, I
examine the essence of the insurance bargain by focusing on risk as a commodity,
and look at insurance risk in light of basic contract principles. Because describing
risk as a commodity is of little value without understanding what risk is, I then
discuss what risk means in the insurance context and what it does not mean. This
illuminates both the role of risk and the role of the insured in the insurance
bargain. Lastly I use the role of the insured and the notion of risk as a commodity
to explain how several insurance law doctrines can be traced to and explained by
fundamental principles of contract law. Relying on these principles, the
examination will show that an insured's ability to alter the risk calculus made by
the insurer should, as a matter of contract law, have consequences.
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INTRODUCTION
It is an axiom of insurance law that an insurance policy provides coverage for
risk of loss. Despite this premise, there exists a high degree of uncertainty as to the
boundaries and role of risk in the framework of insurance law.' This uncertainty
has been probed and examined as a matter of business strategy by several
prominent studies and by experts who have catalogued human thought regarding
risk.2 Risk has not, however, been the subject of systematic examination in the
legal sphere. Indeed, risk is imperfectly expressed in statute,3 case law,4 and policy
language.
My modest aim is to reexamine how we deal with the concept of risk within
insurance law. I begin by analyzing how general contract law has handled risk and
note the limitations of contract law as applied to insurance due to its core: risk.
Next, I examine the essence of an insurance bargain by focusing on risk as a
commodity and look at insurance risk in light of basic contract principles. My
characterization of risk as a commodity is merely a shorthand description for a
contract that has, as a primary component, the assumption of risk by the other
party. Because describing risk as a commodity is of little value without
understanding what risk is, I then discuss what risk means in the insurance context
and what it does not mean. This serves to illuminate both the role of risk and the
role of the insured in the insurance bargain. Lastly, I use the role of the insured and
the notion of risk as a commodity to explain how several insurance law doctrines
can be traced to and explained by fundamental principles of contract law.
At its core, my examination will show that an insured's ability to alter the risk
calculus made by the insurer should, as a matter of contract law, have
consequences. Insurance policies are contracts which deal with the commodity of
risk. Though it is a given that an insured has little flexibility in striking the
insurance bargain because it is an adhesive agreement with set terms not to be
tinkered with, the insured is nonetheless bound by the contract principle that
requires a party to refrain from doing anything that would interfere with the other
1 RICHARD V. ERICSON & AARON DOYLE, UNCERTAIN BUSINESS: RISK, INSURANCE, AND THE LIMITS
OF KNOWLEDGE 5 (2004).
2 Id.; PETER L. BERNSTEIN, AGAINST THE GODS (1996) (aptly subtitled The Remarkable Story ofRisk).
See infra notes 45-49.
4 See infra notes 20-51.
5 See infra notes 43-44.
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party's ability to obtain the benefit of that bargain. While this simple idea seldom
finds voice in the literature or in cases, it serves to explain the bases of many core
insurance concepts.
I. CONTRACT LAW AND RISK
In his influential work, The Costs of Accidents: A Legal and Economic
Analysis, then Dean Guido Calabresi undertook a systematic examination of the
effect of insurance on substantive tort law.6 This contribution has been much
discussed in the past thirty years, and Calabresi's book was aptly the subject of a
law review symposium several years ago.7 However, the effect of insurance law on
substantive contract law and the effect of contract law on substantive insurance law
are not given equal attention.8 The thrust of this paper is that contract law has been
overlooked or at least forgotten in the formulation of basic insurance doctrines.9
This is not to suggest that the pro-insured doctrines extant are not justified as
exceptions to the general application of contract law in the insurance context. After
all, even sophisticated parties represented by counsel often lack the ability to
bargain meaningfully about the terms of insurance policies.10 Rather, a focus on
fundamental principles is useful to explain the underpinning of basic insurance law
doctrines.
In laying out the contract law roots of selected insurance law doctrines in this
article, my intent is not to describe a new theory of coverage defense for insurers. It
is simply to explain in simple terms the contract law roots of common insurance
law doctrines that seldom are the subject of critical examination.
6 GuIDo CALABRESI, THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS: A LEGAL AND ECONOMIC ANALYSIS (1970).
Symposium, Calabresi 's The Costs ofAccidents: A Generation ofImpact on Law and Scholarship, 64
MD. L. REv. 1 (2005).
8 Jeffrey W. Stempel, The Insurance Policy as Thing, 44 TORT TRIAL & INS. PRAC. L.J. 813, 869 n.1
(2009). Professor Jeffrey W. Stempel, a prominent insurance law scholar, has neatly cataloged the
"insurance policy as contract" literature.
9I argue that this is true in spite of the "traditional and dominant conception of insurance" as a contract
transferring a risk of loss to a party in the business of selling such contracts. See Kenneth S. Abraham,
Four Conceptions ofInsurance, 161 U. PA. L. REV. 653, 658 (2013).
1o E.g., Queen City Farms v. Cent. Nat'l Ins. Co., 882 P.2d 703, 712 (Wash. 1994) (citing Boeing Co. v.
Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 784 P.2d 507 (1990) (standard form insurance policies are interpreted "in accord
with the understanding of the average purchaser even if the insured is a large corporation with company
counsel")).
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Thus, I am not advocating a kind of textual hyper-literalism. Indeed, the
inability of humans to express themselves with precision underlies much of
contract law, and this article should not be viewed as an optimistic perspective
about the ability of parties, no matter how sophisticated, to accurately and
completely memorialize agreements. Excessive focus on the text can lead to
incorrect or unfair results when measured against the contract as a whole. Instead,
the contract law principles are used here as the background to trace back and
explain common insurance law doctrines.
Similarly, insurance policies are and remain consumer contracts. Although
individual consumers do not possess the same bargaining power over policy terms
as in other contractual relationships, the insurance market itself can create more
effective and protective, rather than exploitive, terms in the insurance policy.I If
consumers are informed about the content of available policies, and act to
maximize their coverage on the basis of that information, insurance companies
generally have an incentive to draft efficient contracts even when individual assent
is lacking.12 Alternatively, "[i]f consumers are systematically uninformed about
standard contract terms, or biased with regard to processing information about
those terms, then insurance policies may indeed be exploitive in the absence of
government intervention." 3 Professor Daniel Schwarcz suggests that the unique
qualities of the insurance contract create a significant possibility that
"comparatively small levels of imperfect consumer behavior can lead to inefficient
policy terms," and as a result, insureds are similarly vulnerable to exploitive
contracts as in other consumer relationships. 14
Finally, these observations apply to insureds who act within a reasonable zone
of behavior. The behavior of an insured which increases risk beyond that assumed
by an insurer should have consequences. For this reason, many policies include
"increase in hazard" provisions to ensure that the insurer will only be liable for the
risk it actually assumed in the contract. 5 However, courts often police these
provisions to ensure that they are not used to deny coverage to a policyholder who
" Daniel Schwarcz, A Products Liability Theory for the Judicial Regulation of Insurance Policies, 48
WM. & MARY L. REV. 1389, 1402 (2007).
12 Id. at 1402-03.
" Id. at 1403.
4 Id at 1405.
' See Daniel Schwarcz, Reevaluating Standardized Insurance Policies, 78 U. CHI. L. REV. 1263, 1283
(2011).
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has only moderately increased the risk of loss; many courts require a "substantial
change of circumstances materially increasing the risk" for such provisions to be
enforceable.' 6 Even though a policyholder's negligence increases the risk of loss, it
does not always do so enough to warrant adverse consequences for the
policyholder. Indeed, many policies, including homeowners insurance, exist to
cover losses that are the result of negligence.17 Absent increase in hazard
provisions, the traditional insurance doctrines I outline become yet more important
in policing adverse behavior by insureds.
To be sure, courts frequently recognize the congruence between insurance
policies and contracts.' 8 At the same time, there is seldom much analysis that
discusses the necessary consequences of this characterization as a matter of
contract law. 19 Indeed, the recognition that insurance policies are contracts is either
directed to some necessary adjunct of contract law or to some undesirable aspect of
contract law.
It is worth noting at the outset that as a discipline, contract law has been chary
of risk. A significant body of contract law is devoted to the specific difficulty of
dealing with risk and determining which party should bear the consequences of
actualized risk. In this sense, risk is an undesirable consequence of dealing with
other parties. Several historic cases support this thesis. These cases include Raffles
v. Wichelhaus and Hadley v. Baxendale as well as the more modem Aluminum
Company of America ("ALCOA") v. Essex Group. These cases are discussed in
turn.
In Raffles v. Wichelhaus,20 a court was faced with the uncertainty created by
the parties in their contract for the sale and purchase of cotton. The ambiguity
stemmed from the fact that the cotton was to be shipped on a vessel named
SId. at 1284.
Id. at 1283.
18 See, e.g., J.A. Brundage Plumbing & Roto-Rooter, Inc. v. Massachusetts Bay Ins. Co., 818 F. Supp.
553, 556 (W.D.N.Y. 1993), vacated, 153 F.R.D. 36 (W.D.N.Y. 1994); Montrose Chemical Corp. v.
Admiral Ins. Co., 913 P.2d 878, 888 (Cal. 1995).
19 Hazel Beh & Jeffrey W. Stempel, Misclassifying the Insurance Policy: The Unforced Errors of
Unilateral Contract Characterization, 32 CARDOzO L. REV. 85 (2010) (Professor Stempel and Professor
Hazel Beh, who is prominent in her own right, have examined the effect of the bilaterallunilateral
distinction in contracts and its consequent effect on substantive insurance law. Theirs is a step in the
right direction. Professors Beb and Stempel argue that the unilateral contract principle (the exchange of
a promise for performance) has been misapplied in insurance law.).
20 Raffles v. Wichelhaus, (1864) 159 Eng. Rep. 275 (Exch. Div.); 2 Hurl. & C. 906.
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"Peerless." Unbeknownst to the parties, there was more than one ship named
"Peerless," and during the two month difference in time in which the ships were to
arrive in Liverpool, the price of cotton changed to the point that the contract
offered a significant economic advantage to one party at the expense of the other.21
Because there was no basis for assigning the risk of the miscommunication on one
party over the other, the contract was simply declared unenforceable.22 The
unintended irony is that by declaring the contract unenforceable, the court
effectively placed the risk of loss on the adversely affected party.
In Hadley v. Baxendale,23 a mill operator sued a courier after the courier
failed to promptly deliver a broken crank shaft to the manufacturer for repair. The
mill operator claimed that because of the courier's delay in making the delivery, his
plant was forced to shut down for five days longer than would otherwise have been
the case. As such, the mill operator sought recovery for lost profits. In determining
a remedy, the court set forth the rule that recovery for damages is possible if either:
(1) the damages arise naturally or within the contemplation of the parties, or (2)
there were special circumstances that were communicated to the other party.24 In
finding that the mill owner could not recover damages for lost profits, the court
reasoned that "such loss would neither have flowed naturally from the breach of
this contract . . . nor were the special circumstances, which, perhaps, would have
made it a reasonable and natural consequence of such breach of contract,
communicated to or known by the defendants." 25 The court was faced with
deciding who was in a better position to assume the risk that accompanied the
parties' interaction and, ultimately it concluded that the mill operator was better
suited to the task.
In Aluminum Company of America ("ALCOA") v. Essex Group, ALCOA
entered into a sixteen-year agreement with Essex to smelt Essex's alumina, thereby
converting the alumina into molten aluminum.26 ALCOA hired then-economist
21 DOUGLAS G. BAIRD, CONTRACTS STORIES 34 (2007) ("There were reports of at least eleven ships
called Peerless sailing the seven seas at the time, for the name was a popular one.").
22 Raffles, 159 Eng. Rep. at 375.
23 Hadley v. Baxendale, (1854) 156 Eng. Rep. 145 (Exch. Div.); 9 Ex. 341.
2 Id. at 147.
25 Id. at 151. Note that the facts of the case seem to contradict the application of the principle enunciated
in the case. The text of the Hadley v. Baxendale decision suggests that the mill operator did in fact
notify the courier that the shaft needed to be delivered immediately.
26 Aluminum Co. of America v. Essex Group, Inc., 499 F. Supp. 53, 57 (W.D. Pa. 1980).
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Alan Greenspan to assist in creating a pricing formula for the agreement. Under
Greenspan's guidance, a pricing mechanism was ultimately developed under which
the price of aluminum was to be linked to three separate factors, one of them being
ALCOA's production costs other than labor.27 Unfortunately for ALCOA, the
OPEC oil embargo occurred soon after, causing the price of energy-a component
of the pricing mechanism-to increase precipitously. This resulted in losses to
ALCOA of over $75 million by the tenth year of the agreement. 28
In its decision, the court stated:
[W]here parties enter a contract in a state of conscious ignorance of the facts,
they are deemed to risk the burden of having the facts turn out to be adverse,
within very broad limits. Each party takes a calculated gamble in such a contract.
Because information is often troublesome or costly to obtain, the law does not
seek to discourage such contracts.29
Surprisingly, however, the trial court went on to decide that because the parties had
projected that profits would vary between one cent and seven cents per pound upon
entering the contract, the price term should be reformed in order to ensure that
ALCOA would earn no less than one cent per pound as profit.30 Even an expert
such as Alan Greenspan was unable to adequately deal with the risk inherent in
entering into such an agreement.
In each of the preceding conventional cases, the uncertainty created by less
than complete information was a problem to be dealt with as a matter of substantive
contract law. The solution in each of the cases was to declare the contract
unenforceable on its terms or, in the final example, to remake the contract on terms
that were not agreed to by either party.3 ' As stated at the outset, courts frequently
27 Id. at 58.
2 81 d. at 59.
29Id at68.
3 1 Id. at 80.
3' The ALCOA v. Essex case serves as an example where reformation of a contract was preferable to
forfeiture. The approach, in smoothing out what might otherwise be excessively adverse consequences
of the seeming risk allocation of insurance policies, is a solution that suggests itself when the insured
faces forfeiture (and insurer windfall) or the insurer faces major disruptions in its ex ante risk
management calculus. While this is a foray that is perhaps better left to a subsequent examination, it at
least provides the basis for further refinement.
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recognize the congruence between insurance policies and contracts. Risk, the core
of the insurance bargain, is an uncomfortable concept with which contract law
wrangles.
II. THE INSURANCE BARGAIN
As much as contract law in general may wrestle with the element of risk, it is
necessary to reorient the body of insurance law to the notion that an insurance
policy is first and foremost a contract. While this approach has gained currency, it
has largely escaped reflection and critique. Professor Susan Randall, one of the few
scholars to tackle the topic, has recently undertaken a comprehensive critique of the
proposition that insurance policies are contracts.32 She argues persuasively against
the trend for two reasons: first, the trend ignores the fact that insurance policies are
contracts of adhesion in which the insured has little bargaining power, and second,
insurance policies are highly regulated which further relegates the notion of the
insured's bargaining power to the absurd. Professor Jeffrey Stempel also takes the
same general approach in suggesting that an insurance policy, in addition to being a
contract, is a social institution that affects risk management, deterrence, and
compensation functions.34
Although I largely agree with Professor Randall's and Professor Stempel's
cogent analyses, in one sense they go too far. That is, an insured's freedom of
action within the insurance bargain is such that contract law principles remain very
much relevant despite the nature of the adhesive and heavily regulated insurance
bargain. Accordingly, I begin with a focus on risk as a commodity and go on to
explore its relationship, within the insurance bargain, to several common insurance
law principles: the insurable interest requirement, the fortuity doctrine, the known
loss principle, the intentional act exclusion, and moral hazard.
The insurance bargain, at its core, is a relatively simple one. The bargain
between the policyholder and the insurer is one that explicitly involves risk. To
32 Susan Randall, Freedom of Contract in Insurance, 14 CONN. INS. L.J. 107 (2007).
13 Id. at 107-48.
34 See Tom Baker, Risk, Insurance, and the Social Construction of Responsibility, in TOM BAKER &
JONATHAN SIMON, EMBRACING RISK 33, 35-36 (2002) (discussing insurance as a form of social
responsibility); Jeffrey W. Stempel, The Insurance Policy as Social Instrument and Social Institution,
51 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1489 (2010); see Stempel, supra note 8 (discussing a products liability
approach to insurance policies).
3 As a starting point, I adopt Professor Abraham's definition of risk as "the possibility of injury or
loss." KENNETH S. ABRAHAM, DISTRIBUTING RISK: INSURANCE, LEGAL THEORY, AND PUBLIC POLICY
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paraphrase the Restatement Second of Contracts section 1, an insurance policy is
simply a set of promises for the breach of which the law gives a remedy, or for
performance of which the law in some way recognizes an enforceable duty.36 In
particular, an insurance policy involves the exchange of a policyholder's payment
of money in the form of premiums in return for an insurer's agreement to assume
risk. This assumption of risk almost always involves the payment of money,
subject to some agreement to cover the loss that might attend the risk.37 As a result
of this bargain, the policyholder pays a small amount in return for being insulated
against some defined calamity, which would otherwise cause the policyholder a
large loss. The insurer is able to make a profit by entering into similar bargains
with other policyholders. Indeed, as Professor Kenneth Abraham describes, "[t]he
very idea of insurance involves a group of individuals or entities in an indirect
relationship, without any contract specifying the terms of that relationship."3 8 If the
covered peril occurs, the insurer is able to absorb any covered loss that might occur
by effectively distributing the loss among the policyholders.39 In the happy event
that the covered peril does not occur, the insurer is free to keep the premiums
without any expenditure to cover loss. The trick for insurers in all of this is to
balance projected premium income, investment income, projected loss payments
and actual loss payments. However, the risk involved in insurance often is not
calculable except in hindsight, further contributing to the challenge of accurately
determining the degree of risk assumed in a given insurance policy.40 Moreover,
1-2 (1986). As will be seen, his simple formulation is easily up to the task of defining risk as a matter of
contract law. See also Tom Baker, The Shifting Terrain of Risk and Uncertainty on the Liability
Insurance Field, 60 DEPAUL L. REv. 521, 522 (2011) ("Insurance is an 'uncertain business,'
characterized by competition for premiums that pushes insurers into the unknown.").
36 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 1 (1981).
n In the case of liability insurance, the insurer also generally pays the costs of defending the insured
from suits brought by third parties. Pekin Insurance Co. v. Wilson, 237 Ill. 2d 446, 450-51; 930 N.E.2d
1011, 1014 (2010) (describing insurance policy's insuring clause with duty to indemnify and defend);
Aerojet-General Corp. v. Transport Indemnity Co., 17 Cal. 4th 38, 56-58, 70 Cal. Rptr. 2d 118, 128-29,
948 P.2d 909 (1997) (describing typical commercial general liability insurance policies); Gray v. Zurich
Ins. Co., 65 Cal. 2d 263, 272, 54 Cal. Rptr. 104, 109, 419 P.2d 168 (1966) (describing insurer's
undertaking in a liability insurance policy); Douglas R. Richmond, Liability Insurers'Right to Defend
Their Insureds, 35 CREIGHTON L. REv. 115 (2001) (explaining a liability insurer's duties to indemnify
and defend).
38 Abraham, supra note 9, at 656.
3 ABRAHAM, supra note 35.
40 Baker, supra note 35 ("[I]nsurance risks very often are not reliably calculable except in hindsight, at
which point the risk has already been transformed into an all-too-measurable loss.").
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"[e]ven as liability insurers develop technologies that would better predict the
losses of a stable risk pool, competition reshapes companies' risk pools, so that
they operate just beyond the edge of their knowledge."4' This is the science and art
of underwriting and actuarial calculations.42
This simple formulation of the insurance bargain masks the fact that insurance
law has had an uneasy relationship with the concept of risk. Surprisingly, risk is a
concept that finds no mention in the standard insurance policy. For example, of the
six standard insurance forms issued by the non-profit Insurance Service Office,
none contain a definition of "risk." 43 Of the six forms, only one even contains the
word "risk" and even that is a collateral reference apart from the basic insuring
agreement."
Legislatures have shed little light on the subject of risk. For example,
Connecticut's General Statute section 10 provides:
"Insurance" means any agreement to pay a sum of money, provide services or
any other thing of value on the happening of a particular event or contingency or
to provide indemnity for loss in respect to a specified subject by specified perils
in return for a consideration. In any contract of insurance, an insured shall have
an interest which is subject to a risk of loss through destruction or impairment of
that interest, which risk is assumed by the insurer and such assumption shall be
"Id. at 538.
42 JEFFREY W. STEMPEL, LAW OF INSURANCE CONTRACT DISPUTES § 1.05[a] (2d ed. 2002).
4 These forms include: Commercial General Liability Coverage Form CG 00 01 07 98; Homeowners
Policy Form 2-Broad Form HO 00 02 04 91; Homeowners Policy Form 3-Special Form HO 00 03 04
91; Personal Auto Policy Form PP 00 01 06 98; Boiler and Machinery Coverage Form BM 00 25 11 85;
and Farm Property Coverage Form FP 00 10 01 87.
4 That policy is the Homeowners Policy Form 3-Special Form HO 00 03 04 91 which defines the
scope of Coverage A and Coverage B as follows:
Section I-Perils Insured Against
Coverage A-Dwelling and Coverage B-Other Structures
We insure against risk of direct loss to property described in Coverages A
and B only if that loss is a physical loss to property.
Homeowners Policy Form 3-Special Form HO 00 03 04 91 at 6, available at http://www.muller
insurance.com/resources/Homeowners3SpecialForm.pdf (emphasis added).
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part of a general scheme to distribute losses among a large group of persons
bearing similar risks in return for a ratable contribution or other consideration.45
In a similarly long-winded fashion, the New York Code provides that:
[An] "[i]nsurance contract" means any agreement or other transaction whereby
one party, the "insurer", is obligated to confer benefit of pecuniary value upon
another party, the "insured" or "beneficiary", dependent upon the happening of a
fortuitous event in which the insured or beneficiary has, or is expected to have at
the time of such happening, a material interest which will be adversely affected
by the happening of such event.46
California's relevant statute is more succinct but less direct on what insurance
risk actually is. Section 22 of the California Insurance Code defines insurance as "a
contract whereby one undertakes to indemnify another against loss, damage, or
liability arising from a contingent or unknown event."47 Case law supplies the
missing ingredients. California courts have interpreted Insurance Code section 22
as requiring two elements: "(1) a risk of loss to which one party is subject and a
shifting of that risk to another party; and (2) distribution of risk among similarly
situated persons."4 8
The way California arrived at its case-supplemented definition is instructive.
Recognizing that Insurance Code section 22 sets forth only the minimum
requirements to establish that a transaction is insurance for the purposes of
regulation, the California courts adopted the "principal object and purpose" test as
a tool to determine whether a given transaction constitutes insurance or not.49
The reason for this approach is that the statute is overbroad-it could include
many arrangements that involve some aspect of risk shifting and yet are not
commonly viewed as involving insurance. Put another way, the background is that
all contracts have the capacity to shift risk to the other party but it does not follow
4 CONN. GEN. STAT. § 38a-l(10) (2008).
4 N.Y. INs. LAW § 1 101(a)(1) (2008).
47 CAL. INS. CODE § 22 (2008).
48 Truta v. Avis Rent A Car System, Inc., 238 Cal. Rptr. 806, 811 (Cal. Ct. App. 1987) (quoting Metro.
Life Ins. Co. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 652 P.2d 426, 428 (Cal. 1982)).
4 Cal. Physicians' Serv. v. Garrison, 172 P.2d 4, 16 (Cal. 1946); Truta, 238 Cal. Rptr. at 811.
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that all contracts are necessarily insurance. For example, in Transportation
Guarantee Co. v. Jellins, the California Supreme Court held that a lessor's truck
rental business does not amount to the business of insurance simply because the
lessor is obligated to maintain the trucks and keep them in good operating order,
thus shifting the risk from consumers to the rental company.50
This theme has been consistently followed since the Jellins case. Indeed,
California courts have been steadfast in this observation: the mere fact that the
elements required under Insurance Code section 22 (risk shifting and risk
distribution) are satisfied does not necessarily mean that an agreement constitutes
insurance for the purposes of insurance regulation.5 For example, in Truta v. Avis
Rent A Car System, Inc., Avis leased automobiles under a contract by which lessees
paid for a "collision damage waiver" ("CDW").5 2 The CDW provided that if a
leased automobile was damaged, the lessee would not be responsible for the first
$1,000 of damage.s3 The plaintiff, Truta, alleged that the existence of the CDW
meant that Avis was engaged in the business of insurance in California.54 Although
the court acknowledged that Avis' CDW might very well meet the risk shifting and
risk distribution requirements of Insurance Code section 22, it did not follow that
the CDW necessarily constituted insurance for the purposes of regulation.55 Citing
Keeton on Insurance Law, the court opined that insurance regulatory laws were not
to be "properly construed as aimed at an absolute prohibition against the inclusion
of any risk-transferring-and-distributing provisions ... for the sale or rental of
goods."56 After affirming that California case law amply supported the use of the
"principal object and purpose" test, the court concluded that
... [t]he principal object and purpose of the transaction before us, the element
which gives the transaction its distinctive character, is the rental of an
automobile. Peripheral to that primary object is an option, available to the lessee
50 174 P.2d 625, 631-32 (Cal. 1946).
s' See Cates Constr., Inc. v. Talbot Partners, 980 P.2d 407, 422-25 (Cal. 1999); Truck Ins. Exch. v.
Amoco Corp., 41 Cal. Rptr. 2d 551, 556 (Cal. Ct. App. 1995); Truta, 238 Cal. Rptr. at 811-12.
52 Truta, 238 Cal. Rptr. at 808.
53 Id.
54 id
" Id. at 811.
56Id. (citing ROBERT E. KEETON, BASIC TEXT ON INSURANCE LAW § 8.2(c), at 552 (1st ed. 1971)).
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for additional consideration, to reallocate .the risk of loss (up to the sum of
$1,000) to the lessor in the event the vehicle sustains damage during the rental
term.57
Noting that the CDW did not involve indemnity of the lessee for damages to a
third party, the Truta court also observed that there was no public interest to be
protected.58 That is, no person outside of the contractual relationship, an injured
victim for example, was affected by the CDW. Accordingly, the court held that the
leasing of automobiles, even with the CDW, did not constitute insurance for the
purposes of statutory regulation. 59 This approach has survived as a key part of
California insurance law.
Major insurance treatises today uniformly deal with the definition of
insurance by resorting to this same principal object and purpose test.60 The
Appleman treatise provides the broadest definition of insurance, discussing three
separate tests that are used to define this area of law. The first, the "substantial
control test," represents the traditional view. It incorporates five elements, which
are (1) an insurable interest, (2) an insured event (the peril), (3) a risk transfer to the
insurer, (4) distribution of risk by the insurer among a large group, and (5) payment
of a premium-a consideration-to the insurer for the promise to assume the risk
of loss. 6 1 It most nearly resembles the California Insurance Code section 22
approach of focusing on risk shifting and risk distribution.
The Appleman treatise also covers what it describes as the "principal object"
test. This test defines insurance as requiring that risk distribution be a relatively
significant and central feature of a commercial transaction.62 In contrast, a
commercial transaction would not be deemed insurance if risk shifting and risk
sId. at 814.
5 Id. at 813.
*Id. at 814.
60 The Truta approach has been cited with approval by a number of subsequent California courts. See
Auto. Funding Group v. Garamendi, 7 Cal. Rptr. 3d 912, 915 (Cal. Ct. App. 2003); Truck Ins. Exch. v.
Amoco, 41 Cal. Rptr. 2d 551, 556 (Cal. Ct. App. 1995). The most recent case citing Truta with approval
was decided December 23, 2003 and it employs Truta's principal purpose and object test. See
Garamendi, 7 Cal. Rptr. 3d 912.
61 ERIC MILLS HOLMES & MARK S. RHODES, HOLMES' APPLEMAN ON INSURANCE 2D § 1.4, at 22-23
(2d ed. 1996).
62 Id. at 31.
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distribution were simply incidental and ancillary to the other elements which give
the transaction its distinctive nature.6 3 Citing Truta, the Appleman treatise notes
that a significant indication that an arrangement is not insurance is the absence of
an obligation to indemnify third parties.64
The final test discussed in the Appleman treatise is really a supplemental
inquiry. This test, the "regulatory value" test, calls for evaluating and balancing the
interests protected in the transaction with the purposes and policies of state
regulatory insurance laws.6 5 This test essentially replicates the concluding part of
Truta, which discusses whether the public interest is affected.
The Keeton and Widiss treatise states that "[a]lthough risk transference and
risk distribution are among the basic characteristics of almost all insurance
transactions, the resolution of a dispute about what constitutes insurance usually is
predicated on additional factors or considerations." 66 Indeed, according to them,
risk transference and risk distribution alone have not been deemed sufficient to
constitute insurance.67 In a sense, they echo the observation made by the California
courts outlined above.
Finally, Dean Robert Jerry of the University of Florida School of Law goes
even further by stating that "[a]s a general matter, it is clear in the cases that the
existence of indemnification in the relationship, without more, is not enough to
establish that insurance is involved."68 He goes on to state that "[t]he question
turns, not on whether risk is involved or assumed, but on whether that or something
else which is related in the particular plan is its principal object and purpose."69
Like the California case law, the cited treatises uniformly acknowledge that
the existence of risk shifting and distribution is insufficient, in and of itself, to
establish that a particular transaction constitutes insurance. These treatises also
63 See id. at 34-35.
6 Id. No explanation is provided, in such event, as to the existence of first-party insurance.
6
' Id. at 40.
66 ROBERT E. KEETON & ALAN I. WIDISS, INSURANCE LAW: A GUIDE TO FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES,
LEGAL DOCTRINES, AND COMMERCIAL PRACTICES 4 (1988).
61 See id. at 6.
68 ROBERT H. JERRY 11 & DOUGLAS R. RICHMOND, UNDERSTANDING INSURANCE LAW 20 (5th ed.
2012).
69 Id. (citing Jordan v. Group Health Ass'n, 107 F.2d 239, 247-48 (D.C. Cir. 1939)).
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discuss the central role played by the principal object and purpose test in
determining what comprises insurance. For example, Dean Jerry aptly sums up by
(1) observing that all contracts involve the allocation of risk and (2) concluding that
without the principal object and purpose test, literal application of a risk shifting
and risk distribution standard would cause too many contracts to become regulated
when they were not intended to be.7 o
Dean Jerry's summation is instructive. The preceding analysis, which
attempts to characterize some contracts as "insurance" and some as not insurance,
as in Truta, seeks to define insurance for a limited purpose-to see if a given
arrangement is subject to regulation as insurance. The characterization does not and
should not affect the enforcement of the contract between the parties. For example,
the car rental contracts in Truta are perfectly enforceable according to their terms
even though they are not subject to regulation by the California Department of
Insurance.
III. RISK IN INSURANCE POLICIES
Although risk has not been the subject of much curiosity in the body of
insurance law, the deepest inquiry on this topic appears in what has come to be
considered a classic article in insurance law, Fortuity: The Unnamed Exclusion. '
In this article, Stephan Cozen and Richard Bennett, lawyers in a prominent
Philadelphia law firm, defined insurance as a mechanism used to transfer and
distribute risk.72 Their work clearly embraced the idea that risk was central to the
idea of insurance. 73 While their observation was not an altogether novel one, Cozen
and Bennett were the first to systematically analyze what is meant by risk in the
insurance context.
According to Cozen and Bennett, risk was an abstract term difficult to
define.74 Despite this difficulty, they were nonetheless willing to define what risk
was not: it was not certainty.75 Their turn of phrase was succinct: "If risk is central
0 Id. at 14, 27.
n1 Stephen A. Cozen & Richard C. Bennett, Fortuity: The Unnamed Exclusion, 20 FORUM 222 (1984-
85).
7 2 Id. at 224.
73 id
74 Id. (citation omitted).
75 id
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to insurance, then certainty is antithetical to it."76 It followed, in their view, that the
concept of fortuity was essentially an expression of uncertainty.n Because a lack of
fortuity could result in an exclusion of coverage, fortuity was effectively treated
like any other express exclusion. Fortuity, then, was the unnamed exclusion that
formed the title of their article.78
Cozen and Bennett's article has remained influential over the nearly thirty
years of its existence. Since its publication, it has been cited in a myriad of
scholarly journals.79 In addition, their article has been cited by a number of
courts.8 0 In the ultimate compliment, the Supreme Court of Washington invoked
the title of Cozen and Bennett's article in stating that "the fortuity principle is
sometimes called the unnamed exclusion."81
Unfortunately, however, Cozen and Bennett's influence has come at a price.
The price has been a mischaracterization of the concept of risk and fortuity, as
opposed to uncertainty, that lies at the core of their article. It is not their
formulation that requires refinement-after all, insurance fundamentally deals with
risk-but rather, it is their taxonomy. In their article, Cozen and Bennett equated
fortuity with uncertainty. This is understandable considering that their thoughts
tracked the prevailing wisdom at the time. For example, in one of the first cases in
the United States to describe the concept of fortuity, the court explained that "the
perils insured against are risks . .. . It covers a risk, not a certainty." 82 However,
risk is not the equivalent of uncertainty.
76 Id
" Id. at 225.
78 Id. The concept remains unnamed. In the six standard Insurance Services Office policies discussed
above the word fortuity is not found. More recently, one commentator has substantiated Cozen and
Bennett's conception of the fortuity doctrine, defining it as a "contingency or uncertainty with respect to
the risk insured." Matt W. Holley, The "Fortuity Doctrine": Misapplying the Known Loss Rule to
Liability Insurance Policies, 41 TEX. TECH L. REV. 529, 529 (2009) (citation omitted).
7 See, e.g., James L. Knoll & Randy L. Arthur, Property Insurance: No Solution for Pollution, 17 B.C.
ENvTL. AFF. L. REv. 231, 273 n.244 (1990); Michael Sean Quinn, Fortuity, Insurance, and Y2K, 18
REV. LITIG. 581, 588 n.24 (1999); Keith Witten, 'Barn Burning' and What Can Be Done to Prevent It,
22 TORT & INS. L.J. 511, 513 n.8 (1987).
so City of Burlington v. Indem. Ins. Co. of N. Am., 332 F.3d 38, 48 (2d Cir. 2003); Aluminum Co. of
Am. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 998 P.2d 856, 879 (Wash. 2000).
8' Aluminum Co. ofAm., 998 P.2d at 879.
82 Mellon v. Fed. Ins. Co., 14 F.2d 997, 1002 (S.D.N.Y. 1926) (quoting British & Foreign Marine Ins.
Co. v. Gaunt, (1921) 2 A.C. 41 at 57 (Lord Summer)).
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In 1921, Frank Knight, a University of Chicago economist, posited that
uncertainty was "radically distinct from the familiar notion of Risk [sic], from
which it has never been properly separated."83 Essentially, Knight saw uncertainty
as an omnipresent phenomenon.8 Knight eloquently expressed his view in his book
Risk, Uncertainty, and Profit: "We live only by knowing something about the
future; while problems of life, or of conduct at least, arise from the fact that we
know so little."85
Knight's observation has been tacitly validated in a recent work that describes
the uncertainty inherent in the fundamental business of insurance. 6 That is, the
insurance bargain is a business relationship based on probabilities. An insurer seeks
to insulate itself, insofar as it can, from the randomly occurring event that makes its
business a risky proposition. For example, the actuarial tables used in life insurance
demonstrate that some "uncertainties" are not so risky at all. With a large enough
statistical sample, a life insurer takes much of the uncertainty out of its end of the
bargain-it can predict with much the same confidence as a Las Vegas casino what
its loss experience is very likely to be.8 7 The life insurer can then price its
premiums so as to account for its expected payout and still be able to pocket a
handsome sum for its efforts-all the while providing some form of security to its
policyholders. In this sense, a life insurance policyholder faces a great deal of
uncertainty in terms that Frank Knight would describe as the problems of life about
which we know so little.88 The life insurer, in contrast, faces little uncertainty
because probability theory provides it very precise-read certain-information.89
83 BERNSTEIN, supra note 2, at 218-19 (quoting FRANK KNIGHT, RISK, UNCERTAINTY AND PROFIT
(1921)).
8 KNIGHT, supra note 83, at 199.
85 Id
86 ERICSON & DOYLE, supra note I (outlining the risks inherent in underwriting life, disability,
earthquake, and terrorism insurance).
" See Tom Baker, On the Genealogy ofMoral Hazard, 75 TEX. L. REv. 237, 247 (1996).
88 See KNIGHT, supra note 83, at 199.
89 "[M]athematicians transformed probability theory from a gamblers' toy into a powerful instrument for
organizing, interpreting, and applying information. As one ingenious idea was piled on top of another,
quantitative techniques of risk management emerged that have helped trigger the tempo of modem
times." BERNSTEIN, supra note 2, at 4.
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What is clear, however, is that the risk that the insurer deals with is very different
than the uncertainty-the possibility of loss-that the insured seeks to avoid. 90
Using the degree of insurer risk as a means of categorizing insurance
products, life insurance can be seen to occupy one end of a wide spectrum in which
the key variable is the relative size of the statistical sample. Thus, the relatively
large number of deaths that occur in any given year provides life insurers a fairly
large statistical sample upon which to base premium rates. Fire insurance occupies
some place in the broad middle of this spectrum. The reason for this placement,
however, is not that probability plays a lesser part but because the incidence of fires
is significantly less than the mortality rate. The statistical sample-the relative
incidence of fires-is smaller and makes the fire insurer's calculus less certain.
Finally, earthquake insurance is an extreme example of the industry practice
of underwriting risks that demonstrate a high degree of uncertainty.91 The insurer's
uncertainty is magnified by the small statistical sample. In turn, insurer
uncertainty is significantly increased because earthquakes with sufficient
magnitude to cause substantial losses are somewhat rare.93 In this sense, the insured
is more like the Las Vegas gambler who hopes to hit it rich with one pull of the slot
machine lever. In contrast, the insurer hopes to avoid the "hit" with earthquakes.
Cozen and Bennett were tantalizingly close to the realization that risk and
uncertainty are different in the insurance context. Broadly, they recognized that the
concept of fortuity had been ignored in several different respects.
First, Cozen and Bennett saw the courts as reluctant to use the lack of fortuity
to allow an insurer to escape liability.94 According to them, "courts have
9 Ericson and Doyle make the point that the science of underwriting can be inexact. It is, however, the
insurer's sole decision as to whether its science is sound or not. The insurer's decision has nothing to do
with the legal concept of risk. As the authors state, "[b]eneath the veneer of certainty, life insurance is a
very uncertain business ... uncertainty is pervasive for a number of interconnected reasons. Actuarial
data on mortality and morbidity are often crude and of limited applicability in local underwriting
contexts. Aggregate actuarial knowledge is always compromised in the practical decision making of
each insurance company competing in local markets." ERICSON & DOYLE, supra note 1, at 47. They also
state that "while insurers act as a bulwark against uncertainty, they also pay a key role in fostering it."
Id. at i.
9' Id. at 180.
92 
d
93 Id. at 181.
9 Cozen & Bennett, supra note 71, at 223.
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consistently paid lip service to the concept [of fortuity], while finding a variety of
reasons to rule in favor of the insured."95 They believed that an insured's burden of
proving fortuity was but a slight hurdle inasmuch as few cases existed in which
courts found a loss to be non-fortuitous. 96
Cozen and Bennett's pique at courts' reluctance to use fortuity as a way for
insurers to escape responsibility is perhaps explained by the idea that the insurance
bargain is, in fact, not affected by the seeming lack of fortuity. In the few cases in
which courts have accepted a fortuity defense, the circumstances involved either
some form of intentional conduct on the part of the insured, or a loss that had
already occurred.97 The courts' willingness to accept the fortuity defense appears to
have been a result of the insured's role in altering his probabilities, rather than the
existence of a non-fortuitous event.98
Second, Cozen and Bennett believed that the courts had mischaracterized the
role of fortuity by converting it from an objective to a subjective concept. Instead
of determining fortuity based on an evaluation of whether a particular loss was
certain to occur (an objective standard), courts were increasingly looking to
whether the insured was aware that the loss was certain to occur (a subjective
standard).99 The authors believed that viewing fortuity through the eyes of the
insured had the effect of favoring the insured.100 As Cozen and Bennett
propounded, "[a] physical certainty. . . is legally fortuitous' so long as the insured
9 Id.
96 id
97 Hedtcke v. Sentry Ins. Co., 326 N.W.2d 727, 738 (Wis. 1982) (holding insurance coverage is not
available for intentional conduct because it is non fortuitous); RLI Ins. Co. v. Maxxon Southwest, Inc.,
265 F. Supp. 2d 727, 730 (N.D. Tex. 2003) (citations omitted) (stating the doctrine of fortuity bars
coverage where the insured procured insurance they knew they were committing acts for which they
could potentially be found liable).
9 See RLI Ins. Co. v. Maxxon Southwest, Inc., 108 Fed. App'x 194, 199 (5th Cir. 2004) (holding that
the fortuity doctrine barred coverage for the insureds because "the insureds knowingly engaged in
conduct which they knew and intended would economically harm" the party filing suit against them in
the underlying action); Univ. of Cincinnati v. Arkwright Mut. Ins. Co., 51 F.3d 1277, 1284 (6th Cir.
1995) (holding that "when an insured makes a deliberate decision to take an action that produces known
consequences and causes predictable damage to its property, the damages sustained are not the result of
a fortuitous event covered under an all-risk insurance policy"); Two Pesos, Inc. v. Gulf Ins. Co., 901
S.W.2d 495, 502 (Tex. App. 1995) (holding that insured's claim was precluded because the risk of
liability was known at the time the insurance policy was obtained from the insurer).
9 Cozen & Bennett, supra note 71, at 223.
1" Id.
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was unaware that it was going to happen."to' Cast in a different way, Cozen and
Bennett would seem to at least tacitly accept the idea that an insured cannot affect
the probabilities upon which the insurer makes its calculations to take on a
particular risk, for to do so would violate the insurance bargain.
The preceding two propositions can easily be explained on grounds apart
from a doctrine of fortuity by disassociating risk from uncertainty. As stated above,
an insurer can take steps towards managing risk, sometimes transforming
seemingly uncertain situations into those that ultimately involve very little
uncertainty. This is distinct from the uncertainty, or potential for incurring losses,
that insureds seek to minimize through the vehicle of insurance.
Third, Cozen and Bennett also thought the concept of fortuity was being
misconstrued because they believed the courts were conflating the concept of
fortuity with the rules of causation.102 That is, they were concerned with the
problem of coverage in cases where a loss is caused by more than one event, only
one of which might be covered by an insurance policy. In their view, by allowing
coverage in those cases that involved a non-fortuitous, and therefore uncovered,
cause where there was also a concurrent covered cause, the concept of fortuity was
being eviscerated by the courts.10 3 According to them, California was the worst
offender because it allowed coverage of a non-fortuitous loss even when the non-
fortuitous loss was a "substantial, or even a predominant, contributory factor."10
As the authors scornfully stated, "the insured need not demonstrate that negligence
was the 'prime' or 'moving' cause."' 0 5
California's experience can be explained by the simple observation that
covered causes and causation have always been problem areas. This point is
illustrated by Hurricane Katrina and the dispute surrounding the covered wind
damage and the uncovered flood damage that it caused.1 06 The historic difficulty
with concurrent covered and uncovered causes, however, sheds little light on the




106 See In re Katrina Canal Breaches Litig., 495 F.3d 191 (5th Cit. 2007).
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IV. THE INSURANCE BARGAIN AND THE INSURED
A. The Unique Role of the Insured
Cozen and Bennett's conception of fortuity really reflects the role that the
insured plays in the insurance relationship. While uncertainty is inherent in the
contractual assumption of risk by an insurer, this aspect is not germane to the
insured's ability to affect the relationship. The role of the insured as a separate and
distinct actor in the relationship between insurer and insured is an additional matter
to consider. As stated above, the business relationship is based on probabilities. It is
based on the insurer's calculus of the relative probabilities of harm that might occur
in a large population. On the other hand, the insured's role in the relationship is
ostensibly a neutral one. The insured is, or should be, a passive player who simply
waits for covered peril to occur. 0 7
B. Reconciling Insurance Doctrine with the Bargain Involving
Risk
The difficulties with reconciling insurance law doctrine and risk occur when
the insured influences or attempts to influence the probabilities involved. These
difficulties are represented by various doctrines that have, as a common theme, the
insured playing a role which affects the basic probability of loss undertaken by an
insurer. These include the insurable interest doctrine, fortuity, known loss, the
intentional acts exclusion, and moral hazard. In each case, the doctrine or principle
that each touches on goes to the heart of the insurance bargain. Accordingly, I look
at each of several enumerated doctrines or principles from the perspective of the
insured's role and her ability to influence the outcome in a way not contemplated
by the parties. This examination will demonstrate that the behavior of an insured,
which increases risk beyond that assumed by an insurer, has repercussions, apart
from the increase in risk provisions discussed above.
Before beginning an analysis, it is useful to distinguish such actions by
policyholders that increase the risk of the insurance bargain from the law of bad
faith. As used in this article, the two doctrines are not synonymous. Contracts
implicitly require cooperation between the parties and rely on the doctrine of good
faith to prevent "opportunistic behavior that a mutually dependent, cooperative
relationship might enable in the absence of rule."10t Good faith is an implied
promise in every contract "not to take opportunistic advantage in a way that could
107 In this respect, I do not count affirmative measures an insured might take to avoid or mitigate loss.
108 Market St. Assocs. Ltd. P'ship v. Frey, 941 F.2d 588, 595 (7th Cir. 1991).
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not have been contemplated at the time of drafting, and which therefore was not
resolved explicitly by the parties."1 09 It serves that function by "approximating the
terms the parties would have negotiated had they foreseen the circumstances that
have given rise to their dispute."o10 This article does not deal with this kind of
opportunistic behavior, which is better policed with sanctions for breach of the
covenant of good faith and fair dealing." Instead, the focus of this article is on the
insured's ability to alter the risk of loss undertaken by the insurer.
If we accept the notion that an insurer is making a calculated gamble, not in
the sense of gaming, but in the sense of assessing the probability of loss spread out
over a large number of similarly situated persons, then an insured who affects the
probability of loss in some material way has essentially failed to meet a basic
assumption upon which the insurer entered the bargain. The insured should not be
allowed to play this probabilistic game if she is playing with loaded dice.
This is not a novel concept. Implicit with any contract is the idea that no party
to the contract will willfully take any action that interferes with another party's
ability to perform. It would offend common sense and fairness to permit a plaintiff
to recover damages for a breach of contract by another party when the breach is
occasioned by the plaintiff's hand. This doctrine was expressed by Professor Arthur
L. Corbin, who stated:
One who unjustly prevents the performance of the happening of a condition of
his own promissory duty thereby eliminates it as such a condition. He will not be
permitted to take advantage of his own wrong, and to escape from liability for
not rendering his promised performance by preventing the happening of the
'09 Id. (citing Kham & Nate's Shoes No. 2, Inc. v. First Bank, 908 F.2d 1351, 1357 (7th Cir. 1990)).
110 d
". Indeed, in California an insured is not even subject to an insurer's claim of bad faith. In Kransco v.
Am. Empire Surplus Lines Ins. Co., the court held that an insured's breach of the covenant of good faith
is not a recognized affirmative defense for an insurer to absolve itself from liability. 97 Cal. Rptr. 2d
151, 166-67 (Cal. 2000). The insurer, on the other hand, does have a duty of good faith and fair dealing
that is "unconditional and independent of the performance of [the insured's] contractual obligations." Id
at 160 (citing Gruenberg v. Aetna Ins. Co., 9 Cal. 3d 566, 578 (Cal. 1973) (emphasis in original)). This
seemingly inconsistent treatment of the insured and insurer does not mean, as a matter of contract law,
that there are no adverse consequences for actions of the insured. First, because bad faith claims are
generally based on acts occurring post-formation of a contract, the insured is still subject to
consequences arising from his or her actions at the formation stage of a contact. Second, an insured's
breach of express terms under the insurance policy may raise a number of contract defenses for the
insurer, including the voiding of coverage. Id. at 166-67.
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condition on which it was promised. One who himself induces the failure of the
other to perform within the time agreed upon cannot take advantage of such
failure, either by enforcing a prescribed penalty or forfeiture, or by claiming
damages for breach.112
Professor Williston was of the same mind. He stated that "[i]t is a principle of
fundamental justice that if a promisor is himself the cause of the failure of
performance either of an obligation due him or of a condition upon which his own
liability depends, he cannot take advantage of the failure."" 3
This "prevention doctrine" described above by Professors Corbin and
Williston is incorporated in the comments following Restatement (Second) of
Contracts section 245, which provides that
[w]here a duty of one party is subject to the occurrence of a condition, the
additional duty of good faith and fair dealing imposed on him under § 205 may
require some cooperation on his part, either by refraining from conduct that will
prevent or hinder the occurrence of that condition or by taking affirmative steps
to cause its occurrence."l4
112 ARTHUR L. CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 767 (1961) (emphasis added).
"' SAMUEL WILLISTON, WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS § 677 (4th ed. 1993).
" RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 245 (1981). This principle was further expressed by the
Court of Appeals of New York in Patterson v. Meyerhofer, 97 N.E. 472, 473 (N.Y. 1912), in which the
Court stated:
In the case of every contract there is an implied undertaking on the part of
each party that he will not intentionally and purposely do anything to prevent
the other party from carrying out the agreement on his part. This proposition
necessarily follows from the general rule that a party who causes or sanctions
the breach of an agreement is thereby precluded from recovering damages for
its non-performance or from interposing it as a defense to an action upon the
contract. Where a party stipulates that another shall do a certain thing, he
thereby impliedly promises that he will himself do nothing that may hinder or
obstruct that other in doing that thing.
Furthermore, when the insurance policy is viewed through the lens of contract law, one can see that the
insured attempting to obtain coverage for a known loss is committing a kind of fraud, which should
invalidate the policy because it has compromised the meeting of the minds required for contract
formation, not because a general notion of public policy has been violated. Holley, supra note 78, at
529, 531.
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The application of this doctrine in the context of insurance will aid in the
reconciling of insurance law doctrine and the commodity of risk.
1. The Insurable Interest Doctrine
It is a tenet of insurance law that an insured is required to have an interest in
the subject matter as a prerequisite to recovery.' 15 The insurable interest doctrine
would seem to be a prime example of my thesis, that is, that the insurable interest
requirement is a mechanical way of assuring that the insured or beneficiary is
motivated to not affect the insurance bargain. The insurable interest doctrine was
first applied to marine insurance policies in eighteenth century England when
Parliament passed the first act requiring insurance policies to have an insurable
interest.116 The policy rationale was to deter and prevent parties from wagering on
whether a ship and its cargo would make it to the intended destination.117
In the preamble to that first act, Parliament declared that the lack of an
insurable interest requirement in insurance policies encouraged a "mischievous
kind of gaming or wagering, under the pretense of assuring the risque on shipping"
and that this frustrated the insurer's ability to assess the risk.'18 This formulation is
entirely consistent with the idea that parties to a contract should not have a role in
altering the probabilities of harm.119 The problem with respect to case law is that
most of the cases that discuss the doctrine (and there are a lot) do not discuss the
underlying policy rationale. The closest formulation is that no person should be
allowed to benefit from his or her wrongdoing.120 However, even this formulation
1s LEO P. MARTINEZ, INSURANCE LAW 538 (6th ed. 2010).
116 1-1 NEW APPLEMAN ON INSURANCE LAW LIBRARY EDITION § 1.05 [hereinafter NEW APPLEMAN].
Parliament passed the first act requiring an insurable interest in 1746. Id. See Anthony Alt, SPIN-Life
Insurance Policies: A Dizzying Effect on Human Dignity and the Death of Life Insurance, 7 AVE MARIA
L. REV. 605, 610 (2009); JERRY & RICHMOND, supra note 68, at 260-65.
"' NEW APPLEMAN, supra note 116. Additionally, Parliament sought to prevent fraud (i.e. the
intentional destruction of cargo) by requiring an insurable interest.
"' Act of 1746, St. 19 Geo. 2, c. 37, § I (Eng.).
... This is self-evident in the case of life insurance. Thus, a life insurance beneficiary who murders the
insured has skewed the insured's actuarial life expectancy and deserves not to recover. See, e.g.,
Bernstein v. Rosenthal, 671 P.2d 979, 980-81 (Colo. Ct. App. 1983) (holding that evidence of a
coroner's report and death certificate sustained a finding that the beneficiary had killed the insured and
was therefore prevented from taking under the policy, even though there had been no criminal
conviction); Prudential Ins. Co. of Am. v. Athmer, 178 F.3d 473 (7th Cir. 1999) (discussing the problem
of beneficiaries who murder the insured).
20 Prudential Ins. Co. ofAm., 178 F.3d at 475 (Posner, J.).
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arguably articulates a different public policy consideration. That is, wrongdoing
should be subject to some form of punishment or sanction. This is apart from the
contract law idea that a party to a contract should not do anything to interfere with
another party's rights under the contract.
In the same way, although the idea that there is a public policy against
engaging in wagers in the guise of insurance is intriguing in itself, wagering is
entirely different from the idea that public policy should also discourage insureds
or beneficiaries (in the case of life insurance) from doing anything that alters the
risk assumed by the insurer in the transaction.12 1 Dean Jerry and Doug Richmond
have recognized this dichotomy by noting that it is debatable whether the insurable
interest requirement is needed to deter wagering and they observe, "where the
person purchasing the insurance lacks an insurable interest, the risk underwritten by
the insurer is greater; it is in the insurers' self-interest to avoid this additional
risk."1 22 While it is not a good thing to allow an insured to alter the underlying
assumptions of the insurance bargain (a predictable amount of risk), Jerry and
Richmond take the view that insurers are adept at policing this problem.123
2. Fortuity
Case law is replete with statements that fortuity is a requirement in insurance
policies. 124 As Professor Jeffrey Stempel flatly states, "Insurers will usually be
successful only if they are writing coverage for fortuitous events." 25 It is said that
the concept of fortuity is inherent in insurance contracts.126 Insurance is intended to
protect individuals from the economic effects of the unanticipated occurrence of
accidents.127 As noted above, in one of the first cases in the United States to
121 Peter Nash Swisher, The Insurable Interest Requirement for Life Insurance: A Critical Reassessment,
53 DRAKE L. REv. 477, 536 (2005) (wagering is the overriding concern addressed by the insurable
interest requirement in life insurance); JERRY & RICHMOND, supra note 68, at 262 (Parliament's
articulated concern was gaming). A modern-day wagering problem is well-discussed in a recent article.
Alt, supra note 116, at 605.
122 JERRY & RICHMOND, supra note 68, at 258.
123 id.
124 Scottsdale Ins. Co. v. Travis, 68 S.W.3d 72, 75 (Tex. App. 2001) (citing Two Pesos, Inc. v. Gulf Ins.
Co., 901 S.W.2d 495, 502 (Tex. App. 1995)).
125 STEMPEL, supra note 42, at 1-32.
126 Cozen & Bennett, supra note 71, at 223.
127 Chu v. Canadian Indem. Co., 274 Cal. Rptr. 20, 25 (Cal. Ct. App. 1990) (citations omitted)
("Insurance typically is designed to protect contingent or unknown risks of harm, not to protect against
harm which is certain or expected.").
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describe the concept of fortuity the court explained that "the perils insured against
are risks .... It covers a risk, not a certainty."1 28
The term fortuity encompasses the idea of insuring a risk or an event that may
occur by chance.' 29 Cozen and Bennett wrote, "[t]o be compensable, the loss must
be fortuitous, which is to say that it must be caused by a fortuitous event."130
"Fortuitous event" is defined as
an event which so far as the parties to the contract are aware, is dependent on
chance. It may be beyond the power of any human being to bring the event to
pass; it may be within the control of third persons; it may even be a past event,
such as the loss of a vessel, provided that the fact is unknown to the parties.13 1
Professor Stempel is closest to the mark with his succinct definition of
fortuity as the equivalent of chance.' 32 According to him, if the losses are intended
or expected by the policyholder, they are therefore not the result of chance. 3 3 Still,
Professor Stempel does not go as far as I do with the suggestion that fortuity should
be relegated to the ash heap.
The case law and legal scholarship have consistently described the doctrine of
fortuity as a "requirement" of insurance, as a "public policy" matter of insurance
law, or as "inherent" in insurance.134 As is developed below, only the latter comes
close to accurately describing the role of fortuity in insurance law.
128 Mellon v. Fed. Ins. Co., 14 F.2d 997, 1002 (S.D.N.Y. 1926). This view persists even today. One
recent commentator repeats the mantra that fortuity is required of all insurance policies. Holley, supra
note 78, at 530. He follows this by observing "that insurance is intended to cover risks, not certainties."
Id. He goes on to argue that fortuity has no application in liability insurance policies because the risk of
a third party action is inherently uncertain. Id. at 535.
2 9 BLACK's LAW DICTIONARY 680 (8th ed. 2004).
1" Cozen & Bennett, supra note 71, at 225 (citing Avis v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 195 S.E.2d 545, 548
(N.C. 1973)).
131 Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee v. Ins. Co. of N. Am., 724 F.2d 369, 372 (3d Cir. 1983) (citing
RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 291 cmt. a (1932)) (emphasis in original).
132 STEMPEL, supra note 42, at 1-32.
'3 Id. at 1-33.
1" Churchill v. Factory Mut. Ins. Co., 234 F. Supp. 2d 1182, 1188 (W.D. Wash. 2002) (citations
omitted) (opining that the public policy of preventing fraud requires fortuity with regard to insurance
loss); Scottsdale Ins. Co. v. Travis, 68 S.W.3d 72, 75 (Tex. App. 5th Dist. 2001) (citations omitted)
ISSN 0041-9915 (print) 1942-8405 (online) * DOI 10.5195/lawreview.2013.297
http://lawreview.law.pitt.edu
A UNIFIED THEORY OF INSURANCE RISK
PAGE | 741
Keeton and Widiss took the public policy route in their treatise. They saw
fortuity as "imposed by the courts as a matter of public policy when there is no
express limitation set forth in the applicable insurance policy . . . ."35
Unfortunately, they do not describe the contours of the public policy that is
involved. Dean Jerry's fine text, Understanding Insurance Law, describes fortuity
as a requirement of the insurance bargain, going as far as to state that "[t]he public
policy underlying the fortuity requirement is so strong that if the insurance policy
itself does not expressly require that the loss be accidental courts will imply such a
requirement."l36 At the same time, Dean Jerry concedes "at a certain point the logic
of the fortuity requirement begins to unravel at the edges."
The elusiveness of the problem causes me to focus on the insurance bargain
itself. The nature of the insurance bargain is an exchange of money for the
assumption of risk. In this context the parties recognize that the assumption of risk
by an insurer is the commodity-if it can be described as such-being sold. If that
is the case, to describe fortuity as a "requirement" misses the point. In that sense,
fortuity is no more "required" in an insurance policy than is an automobile
"required" in a sale of a Ferrari. In each case, the subject of the bargain-the
assumption of a risk in the former example and the Ferrari in the latter example-is
part of the contract itself. That being the case, there should be no additional
"requirement" that the assumption of risk or the Ferrari is part of the contract. As
Professor Kenneth Abraham puts it:
To the extent that policy language already satisfactorily reflects the fortuity
requirement, making reference to the requirement as if it were not entirely
subsumed within applicable policy language could only risk implying incorrectly
to decision makers that they had two decisions to make, one applying policy
(holding that "fortuity is an inherent requirement of all risk insurance policies"); Hedtcke v. Sentry Ins.
Co., 326 N.W.2d 727, 737 (Wis. 1982) (citations omitted) (maintaining public policy goals of fortuity
doctrine include avoiding profit from wrongdoing, deterring crime, and avoiding fraud against insurers);
Douglas G. Houser, Y2K: A "Fortuitous" Loss?, 36 WILLAMETTE L. REv. 29, 32 (2000).
135 KEETON & WtDISS, supra note 66, at 475.
136 JERRY & RICHMOND, supra note 68, at 413-14.
1 71 d. at 418.
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language and the other applying the separate and additional requirements of a
legal rule regarding fortuity.'38
To suggest "fortuity" is a separate concept apart from the insurance bargain simply
is untenable. At best, it does little to aid in understanding the idea of fortuity.
Similarly, the reliance on a "public policy" justification as an explanation of
fortuity misses the mark. There appears to be nothing truly inherent in the
insurance bargain that supports a public policy rationale for fortuity. It may very
well be that an insurer would agree to cover non-fortuitous losses. Such a business
model might not be prudent or wise, but public policy does little to police
improvident bargains entered into by sophisticated parties. This is illustrated by a
cousin of the fortuity doctrine, the known loss doctrine.
3. Known Loss
With the background provided by the fortuity discussion, the known loss
doctrine is easy to place in the framework as it is closely related to fortuity.
Broadly, the fortuity doctrine bars coverage for known losses.' 39 The idea behind
fortuity is that insurance is intended to cover losses that occur by chance. At the
same time, there seems to be no legal barrier to the enforcement of a contract which
is not insurance from covering a known loss.
An example of the foregoing is so called "retroactive insurance." Retroactive
insurance provides a way for a policyholder to receive a number of benefits from
an insurance policy for an event that has already occurred.140 In addition to
indemnity, these benefits might include claims-handling expertise, systematic and
consistent treatment of claimants, and, sometimes, special tax benefits.141 Where
13 Kenneth S. Abraham, Peril and Fortuity in Property and Liability Insurance, 36 TORT & INS. L.J.
777, 781-82 (2001).
13 See Summers v. Harris, 573 F.2d 869, 872 (5th Cir. 1998); Inland Waters Pollution Control, Inc. v.
Nat'l Union Fire Ins. Co., 997 F.2d 172, 175-77 (6th Cir. 1993); Montrose Chem. Corp. v. Admiral Ins.
Co., 913 P.2d 878, 904 (Cal. 1995); Scottsdale Ins. Co., 68 S.W.3d at 75 (citing Burch v.
Commonwealth Mut. Ins. Co., 450 S.W.2d 838, 840-41 (Tex. 1970)).
' Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, Toward Unlimited Shareholder Liability for Corporate
Torts, 100 YALE L.J. 1879, 1899 n.53 (1991); Michael L. Smith & Robert C. Witt, An Economic
Analysis ofRetroactive Liability Insurance, 52 J. RISK & INS. 379 (1985).
141 Dean Jerry and Doug Richmond discuss the particular example of the 1981 MGM Grand fire. JERRY
& RICHMOND, supra note 68, at 390 n.64 (explaining that retroactive insurance is enforceable,
notwithstanding the doctrine of fortuity, where loss was certain, but the amount of loss and the time the
loss would be compensated were not certain). See Donald Arthur Winslow, Tax Avoidance and the
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retroactive insurance is involved, there seems to be no real question of whether
such a bargain is valid-even if the loss is known. At least one commentator notes
the absence of statutory limitations on retroactive insurance and expresses surprise
at the absence of a market of such a product. 142 Hence, the public policy grounds
advanced to support a known loss doctrine appear weak indeed.143
To refine the notion of the insurance bargain further, it makes sense that a
conventional insurance policy would not cover a known loss. This is not founded
on public policy grounds; rather, it is a violation of the insurance bargain itself. The
insured has sought coverage for an event that was no longer subject to the rules of
probability. At the same time, where an insurer is aware of the loss and voluntarily
issues a policy covering such loss, public policy should place no impediment on
coverage when the insurer has the opportunity to account for the change in the
probability.1"
4. Intentional Acts
Insurance policy language, some state statutes, and case law exclude coverage
for the intentional acts of policyholders and insureds. It is even possible for an
insurer to avail itself of the intentional act exclusion by showing that the nature of a
tort committed by its insured has an element of intentional wrongdoing. 145
Definition of Insurance: The Continuing Examination of Captive Insurance Companies, 40 CASE W.
RES. L. REV. 79, 121 (1990) (discussing the tax aspects of insurance).
142 Michael Abramowicz, On the Alienability ofLegal Claims, 114 YALE L.J. 697, 748-50 (2005) (citing
the MGM Grand hotel fire as an example).
143 Perhaps the real issue with respect to the known loss principle is the classification of contracts as
insurance for the purposes of regulation as in Truta. See Truta v. Avis Rent A Car System, Inc., 238 Cal.
Rptr. 806, 811 (Cal. Ct. App. 1987) (quoting Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 652 P.2d
426, 428 (Cal. 1982)).
1" Dean Jerry and Doug Richmond acknowledge as much by the observation that "economic exchanges
between parties of equal bargaining power should be enforced, assuming the transaction does not
implicate some sort of public policy concern." JERRY & RICHMOND, supra note 68, at 457. My mild
disagreement is that I do not believe there is an articulated public policy concern that would otherwise
affect this bargain. See also Holley, supra note 78, at 532 (maintaining that if both parties are aware that
the loss has occurred, there is no impediment to coverage as the contract is valid and enforceable).
' Allstate Ins. Co. v. Tankovich, 776 F. Supp. 1394, 1397 (N.D. Cal. 1991) (insurer is not liable for a
loss caused by the willful act of the insured); State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Drasin, 199 Cal. Rptr. 749,
751 (Cal. Ct. App. 1984) (malicious prosecution not covered because it has an element of
intentionality). I put in this category the increasingly common "criminal acts" exclusion. I focus on
intentional acts because it is the broader concept.
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Although the intentional injury doctrine seems to be widely accepted, those
experienced with the vagaries of insurance law know that application of this
doctrine is not an exercise in accurate prediction. " At the surface, the intentional
acts exclusion would seem to invite a straightforward application of the doctrine,
that the nature of the insurance bargain does not leave room for a policyholder or
an insured to unfairly influence the basis on which an insurer makes its probability
calculations. Ultimately, I think this is the correct result. However, the context in
which the intentional acts exclusion applies does not, at first glance, simplify the
analysis. The public policy underpinnings of the exclusion have been treated with
varying degrees of import by the courts. Courts have had difficulty defining
intentional conduct that falls within policy exclusion language.147 Dealing with
various aspects of the exclusion, such as the role of third parties, the duty to defend,
and the desire to compensate victims, further complicates the application of the
exclusion. As a result, the application of the intentional conduct doctrine has
proved vexing for both policyholders and insurers in such disparate areas as
employment discrimination, intellectual property infringement, and criminal sexual
misconduct.
The contractual limitation on intentional acts is contained, by way of
example, in the standard Commercial General Liability Policy (CGL) form, which
provides that:
[C]overage is excluded for "bodily injury" or "property damage" that is expected
or intended from the standpoint of the insured. This insurance does not apply to
personal and advertising injury that is caused by or at the direction of the insured
with the knowledge that the act would violate the rights of another and would
inflict "personal and advertising injury."
' JERRY & RICHMOND, supra note 68, at 413-55. Worth noting is that Dean Jerry and Doug Richmond,
who cannot be said to be prolix, take more than 40 pages to explain the vagaries of the intentional acts
exclusion.
147 "[Un Gray v. Zurich Insurance Co., the California Supreme Court subjected an exclusion for losses
caused by the insured's intentional acts to the rigorous rules applicable to exclusions generally . . ." and
examining whether the exclusion language was conspicuous, plain and clear. See James M. Fischer, The
Exclusion From Insurance Coverage of Losses Caused by the Intentional Acts of the Insured: A Policy
in Search ofJustification, 30 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 95, 105 (1990).
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The interpretation of this intentional act exclusion language follows a
predictable path in California.148 The general antipathy towards coverage
exclusions has led California courts to narrowly construe the text of most standard
intentional injury exclusions contained in liability insurance polices. Thus,
California courts have generally resorted to interpretations of the exclusion that
avoid their effect. For example, in the classic case of Gray v. Zurich Insurance Co.,
the California Supreme Court held that insurance policy language which excluded
coverage for "bodily injury or property damages caused intentionally by or at the
direction of the insured" was sufficiently ambiguous to be characterized as
surrounding the insured "by concentric circles of uncertainty." 4 9 This, coupled
with the doctrine of "reasonable expectations" articulated in an earlier case, Steven
v. Fidelity and Casualty Company of New York, made the suddenly inconspicuous
and unclear provision hard to enforce. 50
More recently, the California Supreme Court had occasion to interpret the
exclusionary clause in a similar case. In Safeco Insurance Co. ofAmerica v. Robert
S., the court held that an exclusionary clause, which broadly excluded "illegal"
acts, could not be construed to exclude a crime by equating the word "illegal" to
mean "criminal."s'5 Hence the insured's conviction of involuntary manslaughter
was, remarkably, held not to be within the ambit of the word "illegal." 52 Without
48 "The experience of California courts in applying § 533 of the Insurance Code is typical of the
evolution of a rule of law by way of dicta." Donald F. Farbstein & Francis J. Stillman, Insurance for the
Commission ofIntentional Torts, 20 HASTINGS L.J. 1219, 1246 (1969).
149 419 P.2d 168, 170, 174 (Cal. 1966). This approach was also followed in a New York case in 1991,
Fitzpatrick v. American Honda Motor Co., Inc. In Fitzpatrick, the New York Court of Appeals went
beyond New York's general approach and asserted that "the insurer must provide a defense if it has
knowledge of facts which potentially bring the claim within the policy's indemnity coverage." 575
N.E.2d 90, 92 (N.Y. 1991). The court explained that exclusive reference to the third party's complaint,
albeit for a potentially intentional act, might lead the insurer to avoid its obligations under the insurance
contract. Id.
50 377 P.2d 284, 288 (Cal. 1962). See also Robert H. Jerry 11, Insurance, Contract, and the Doctrine of
Reasonable Expectations, 5 CONN. INS. L.J. 21 (1998). Dean Jerry explores the development of the
Doctrine of Reasonable Expectations within insurance law, beginning with Judge Keeton's 1970
Harvard Law Review article, which identified the principle that the insured's reasonable expectations
should be recognized. Id The Doctrine of Reasonable Expectations protects the weaker party in a
contract transaction by charging insurers with a duty to honor the insured's reasonable expectations. Id.
Dean Jerry concludes that the doctrine should apply not only to insurance law, but to contract law
principles in general. Id.
"' 28 P.3d 889, 893-95 (Cal. 2001).
1
5
2 Id. at 894.
ISSN 0041-9915 (print) 1942-8405 (online) * DOI 10.5195/lawreview.2013.297
http://lawreview.law.pitt.edu
UNIVERSITY OF PITTSBURGH LAW REVIEW
PAGE 1746 I VOL. 74 |2013
explicit mention of the statute, the court effectively interpreted the policy as
excluding only intentionally caused injury.'53 Again, the court chose to avoid
application of the exclusion by characterizing the "ambiguous" language as
incapable of being given a reasonable meaning under established rules of contract
construction. The exclusion was thus deemed unenforceable.' 54
Surprisingly, while the intentional acts exclusion is widely cited by courts in
most jurisdictions, the statutory framework to support the doctrine is nearly
nonexistent. This is especially surprising because of the widely articulated public
policy rationale underpinning the exclusion. Apparently the public policy is not so
strong as to have motivated legislatures to act. Only three states have codified the
doctrine in statute to date. Two of the three states, California and North Dakota,
share the similar statutory language. 1" California's Insurance Code section 533
provides that "[a]n insurer is not liable for a loss caused by the willful act of the
insured; but he is not exonerated by the negligence of the insured, or of the
insured's agent or others."' 56 The existence of these statutes has meant that courts
commonly disallow an insurer from agreeing to cover acts excluded by such
statutes. 57
In addition to California and North Dakota, Massachusetts has also chosen to
make the intentional acts exclusion a statutory requirement. Massachusetts General
Laws 175 section 47 departs from the language used by the California and North
Dakota statutes and adopts a loftier, more aspirational tone. It provides that "no
company may insure any person against legal liability for causing injury, other than
bodily injury, by his deliberate or intentional crime or wrongdoing, nor insure his
153 Id. at 900. See also Minkler v. Safeco Ins. Co. of Am., 232 P.3d 612, 614 (Cal. 2010) (holding that an
exclusionary clause barring coverage for injury that was "expected or intended by an insured," read in
conjunction with a severability clause, is not applicable in a case where the insured negligently fails to
prevent the intentional acts of another insured).
154 Safeco Ins. Co. of Am. v. Robert S., 28 P.3d 889, 895 (Cal. 2001).
15s See CAL. INS. CODE § 533 (West 2012).
156 See Nuffer v. Ins. Co. of N. Am., 45 Cal. Rptr. 918, 925 (Cal. Ct. App. 1965) (demonstrating that a
"wilful act" within the meaning of this section means something more than ordinary negligence or the
mere intentional doing of an act; the existence of an intent to injure is relevant). North Dakota's
Insurance Code provides "[a]n insurer is not liable for a loss caused by the wilful act of the insured; but
the insurer is not exonerated by the negligence of the insured, or of the insured's agent or others." N.D.
CENT. CODE § 26.1-32-04 (2011) (substituting "the insurer" for the word "he").
.. See Shell Oil Co. v. Winterthur Swiss Ins. Co., 15 Cal. Rptr. 2d 815, 830-31 (Cal. Ct. App. 1993);
Ohio Cas. Ins. Co. v. Clark, 583 N.W.2d 377, 385 (N.D. 1998).
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employer or principal if such acts are committed under the direction of his
employer or principal."'15 Massachusetts courts have been just as clear in adhering
to this statutory guideline that disallows coverage for intentional acts.159
As we have developed some sophistication in the analysis of insurance law
doctrines, the import of the intentional acts exclusion has increased, due in part to
the basic nature of the exclusion and its consequent overarching effect. 60
Therefore, despite the fact that only three states have enacted statutes with regard to
the intentional injury exclusion, public policy firmly establishes the doctrine in the
vast majority of jurisdictions. Indeed, the public policy articulated by courts in
most states tends to be in harmony with the statutory language adopted by
California, North Dakota, and Massachusetts. In Illinois, New York, and Florida,
for example, case law abounds in which courts have clearly indicated that
indemnification of an intentional act would run contrary to accepted notions of
public policy.161
As will be examined below, a great deal of inconsistency accompanies the
public policy underpinnings of the intentional acts exclusion. This same
discrepancy can be seen in the courts' attempts to define intentional conduct that
falls within policy exclusion language. As Dean Jerry states, "the exclusion has not
been an easy one to apply in many situations." 62A few examples will help
illustrate the point.
In Tomerlin v. Canadian Indemnity Company, a case in which the complaint
alleged an intentional battery, the California Supreme Court held that the insurer
was estopped from denying liability under the policy because of the representations
of its agent attorney. 63 The court stated, "[a]lthough an insurer may not indemnify
against liability caused by the insured's wilful wrong, defendant's liability here
'" MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 175, § 47 (2008).
159 See Andover Newton Theological Sch. v. Cont'l Cas. Co., 566 N.E.2d 1117 (Mass. 1991).
160 Fischer, supra note 147, at 99 (1990). See also JERRY & RICHMOND, supra note 68, at 441 ("[A]fter
the mid-1960s] it became common to find liability policies stating that coverage would not exist for
[acts] intended from the standpoint of the insured.").
161 See, e.g., Windmill Pointe Village Club Ass'n v. State Farm General Ins., 779 F. Supp. 596, 598
(M.D. Fla. 1991), rev'd and vacated, 978 F.2d 774 (11th Cir. 1993); State Farm v. Leverton, 732 N.E.2d
1094, 1097 (Ill. App. Ct. 2000); Litrenta v. Republic Ins., 665 N.Y.S.2d 679, 680 (N.Y. App. Div.
1997).
162 JERRY & RICHMOND, supra note 68, at 441.
16' 394 P.2d 571, 577 (Cal. 1964) (citations omitted).
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does not arise from a contract executed prior to plaintiffs wilful misconduct, but
from an estoppel which arose after it. Recovery under a subsequent estoppel does
not offend such public policy."'6
The California Supreme Court's decision in Gray v. Zurich, discussed above,
provides another example of the unpredictability that surrounds the application of
the intentional acts exclusion. In reaching its decision, the Gray v. Zurich court
distinguished the duty to defend from the duty to indemnify, stating that:
[insurance] statutes forbid only contracts which indemnify for "loss" or
"responsiblity" resulting from wilful wrongdoing. Here we deal with a contract
which provides for legal defense against an action charging such conduct; the
contract does not call for indemnification of the insured if the third party
plaintiff prevails. 165
Based on this distinction, the court held that "the present contract does not offend
[public policy because] . .. a contract to defend an [insured] upon mere accusation
of a wilful tort does not encourage such wilful conduct."' 66 So, once an insurer has
undertaken the duty to defend and the third party prevails, "the insurer can [then]
raise the noncoverage defense previously reserved. In this manner the interests of
insured and insurer in defending against the insured party's primary suit will be
identical; the insurer will not face the suggested dilemma."l 67
Pursuant to the Gray holding, the court in Montrose Chemical Corp. v.
Superior Court,'68 held that as long as the plaintiff which sued Montrose could
show that the "'possibility' exist[ed] that Montrose was negligent, the insurers must
immediately defend unless and until they can conclusively establish" that Montrose
intentionally or deliberately caused environmental contamination. 169 According to
'6Id. at 577-78 (citation omitted).
16s 419 P.2d 168, 177 (Cal. 1966).
'" Id
16 Id at 178.
168 861 P.2d 1153 (Cal. 1993).
169 Paula L. Harrington, Note, The Duty to Defend in California After Montrose Chemical Corporation v.
Superior Court: Is the Cahfornia Supreme Court Protecting Policyholders or Encouraging Litigation
and the Early Settlement of Unworthy Claims?, 31 CAL. W. L. REV. 165, 179 (1994) (quoting Montrose
Chem. Corp., 861 P.2d at 1161).
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one commentator, Paula Harrington, "[e]ven. where the facts learned from all
sources overwhelmingly point to intentional conduct, the insurer is not free to
unilaterally deny a duty to defend without facing a court ruling that it must defend
based on a mere possibility of coverage."' 70
It should be noted, however, that regardless of how broadly an insurer's duty
to defend claims of intentional acts is defined under the Gray test, that duty is not
infinite. In Gray, the insurer had a duty to defend because of the possibility of a
judgment against the insured based upon nonintentional conduct.' 7 ' However, that
is not always the case. Ultimately,
The insurer's duty to defend is linked to coverage under its policy; an insurer's
promise to defend its insured against even groundless, false or fraudulent suits
does not affect this basic principle. An insurer's contractual obligation to defend
baseless, meritless or specious claims does not mean that it is bound to defend
claims that its policy does not cover.... No matter how broadly construed an
insurer's duty to defend might be, an insurer has no duty to defend when there is
no potential for coverage under any theory. 72
Courts outside of California have had no less difficulty developing a bright
line test for determining when an insurer has a duty to defend an insured against
allegations of an intentional act. Recent decisions in Michigan have held that
insurance coverage is not precluded as a matter of law under the intentional acts
exclusion unless the insured intended both the act and the injury.' In Louisiana,
the State Supreme Court established that an injury is barred from insurance
coverage only when the insured has the subjective intent to cause a specific
injury.174 Unfortunately, however, these tests do little to provide consistency in the
"o Id at 191.
171 Gray, 419 P.2d 168.
172 Douglas R. Richmond, Reimbursing Insurers' Defense Costs: Restitution and Mixed Actions, 35 SAN
DIEGO L. REv. 457, 460 & n.17 (1998) (emphasis added).
"7 See Arco Indus. Corp. v. Am. Motorists Ins. Co., 531 N.W.2d 168 (Mich. 1995); City of Bronson v.
Am. States Ins. Co., 546 N.W.2d 702 (Mich. Ct. App. 1996); Auto-Owners Ins. Co. v. Harrington, 538
N.W.2d 106 (Mich. Ct. App. 1995); Charles W. Browning, Annual Survey ofMichigan Law, 43 WAYNE
L. REv. 1033, 1064-77 (1997).
174 Breland v. Schilling, 550 So. 2d 609, 611 (La. 1989). See J. Lobrano, Recent Development: Breland
v. Schilling: The Intentional Act Exclusion Clause in the General Liability Policy-What Did You
Intend?, 65 TUL. L. REV. 443, 446-47 (1990).
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application of the exclusion. In a case that was resolved by the Eleventh Circuit,
juveniles were playing a "BB gun game" which ultimately caused an eye injury.'75
The court held that the intentional act exclusion did not apply if the nineteen year-
old insured's intentional act caused harm when his intent was to cause no harm.176
Yet, in a Kansas case, the intentional act exclusion applied if the eleven year-old
insured knew the consequences were substantially certain to result from his act.177
The tendency to find coverage in the face of intentional acts cannot to be
underestimated. Even a criminal conviction of fraud may not preclude the duty to
defend. In United States v. Weiner, W., L., and B. were each convicted on several
fraud counts of violating Federal securities laws.'78 They belonged to an accounting
firm that maintained a professional liability policy with St. Paul Fire and Marine
Insurance Company. 79 Civil suits for damages, some of which were based on
negligence, were then filed against W., L., and B.' St. Paul asked the court to
declare that it need not provide W., L., and B. with a defense.'8 ' It referred to a
clause in the professional liability policy excluding liability for "dishonesty,
misrepresentation, or fraud." 82 The court reversed summary judgment in favor of
the insurer because "[d]espite the defendants' criminal convictions, the possibility
remained that St. Paul had a duty to defend the civil actions brought against the
defendants." 83
In contrast, the heinous nature of sex crimes would appear to provide a
straightforward resolution of the intentional acts exclusion. Indeed, in J C. Penney
Casualty Insurance Co. v. MK, the California Supreme Court held that "insurers
are not required to indemnify their insureds for damages caused by an insured's
sexual molestation of a child."' 84 Even though before trial the third party dismissed
"7 Allstate Ins. Co. v. Steinemer, 723 F.2d 873, 874 (11th Cir. 1984).
"7 Id. at 877.
17 See Bell v. Tilton, 674 P.2d 468 (Kan. 1983).
17' 578 F.2d 757, 763 (9th Cir. 1978).
179 606 F.2d 864, 866 (9th Cir. 1979).
"s0 Id. at 866, 869.
... Id. at 865-46.
2 Id. at 867.
183 Id. at 869.
'" 804 P.2d 689, 690 (Cal. 1991).
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all claims of intentional tort and pursued only claims of negligence, the court
concluded "there is no coverage as a matter of law..... [E]very court to decide this
issue under California law has held that a homeowner's insurance policy does not
provide liability coverage for child molestation."185 In the court's view, "[s]ome
acts are so inherently harmful that the intent to commit the act and the intent to
harm are one and the same."' 86
The absolute and seemingly intuitive pronouncement made by the California
Supreme Court in the J C Penney Casualty Insurance Co. v. MK. case has since
been tempered. In National Union Fire Ins. Co. v. Lynette C., for example, the
California Court of Appeal concluded that the insurer had a duty to provide
coverage for the insured when, based on a jury verdict, she negligently failed to use
reasonable care to prevent the sexual molestation of a child by her husband.'87 The
exclusionary clause of the policy protected the insured unless a final judgment
established "acts of active or deliberate, licentious, immoral or sexual behavior
committed by the Insured with actual licentious or immoral purpose and intent
were material to the cause of action."' 88 Construing broadly any ambiguities in the
policy in favor of the insured, the court found that the exception to the policy
exclusion could be reasonably read to protect one insured against claims based on a
second insured's (the husband's) sexual conduct as long as the first insured had not
directly engaged in the conduct. 189 The court held that this comported with the
reasonable expectations of an ordinary person and therefore the insurer had the
duty to provide coverage under the language of the policy.' 90 Additionally, the
court held that coverage under these circumstances would not violate public policy
since the insured did not directly engage in intentional or criminal acts, only
negligent conduct.' 9' Here the court cited California Insurance Code section 533,
8' Id. at 693.
186 Id. at 698. See also Reagan's Vacuum Truck Serv., Inc. v. Beaver Ins. Co., 37 Cal. Rptr. 2d 89 (Cal.
Ct. App. 1994) (no potential for coverage for intentional torts of intentional concealment and aggravated
injury and intentional infliction of emotional distress).
8 279 Cal. Rptr. 394 passim (Cal. Ct. App. 1991).
8 Id. at 396.
"9 Id. at 396-97.
90 Id. at 398.
'9' Id. at 402.
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which "expressly provides that an insurer is not exonerated by the negligence of the
insured."1 92
As the foregoing illustrates, analysis of the intentional injury exclusion can be
unexpectedly difficult. Decisions regarding the intentional acts exclusion are
further complicated by three primary practical difficulties. First, the intentional acts
exclusion in the context of liability insurance necessarily involves a third party
claimant whose complaint shapes the scope of a policyholder's coverage. Second,
the analysis of exclusions for intentional conduct in the context of liability
insurance often implicates not only the insurer's duty to indemnify but also its duty
to defend. Third, the public policy favoring compensation for victims colors the
denial of coverage for insureds.
a. The Third Party's Role
The first factor that complicates application of the intentional acts exclusion is
that liability coverage for an insured's torts necessarily involves a third party
claimant whose complaint shapes the scope of an insured's coverage. The difficulty
is created by the myriad of different analytical approaches courts use in
192 Id. at 401. Accord Horace Mann Ins. Co. v. Barbara B., 846 P.2d 792, 797-98 (Cal. 1993).
Following this thread, the Supreme Court of Wisconsin in Loveridge v. Chortler, 468 N.W.2d
146 (Wis. 1991), held in part that statutory rape of a consenting sixteen year old female was not harmful
as a matter of law, and that allowing insurance coverage for negligent transmission of a sexually
transmitted disease would not violate public policy. Id. at 157-58. In response to the nationwide
increase in similar claims, many homeowner's policies now include an "STD" exclusion.
In another California Appeals court decision, State Farm & Casualty Co. v. Eddy, the court found
that the insurer had a duty to defend the insured against a complaint which alleged both negligent and
intentional torts, specifically the infliction of genital herpes on a third party by way of voluntary sexual
intercourse. 267 Cal. Rptr. 379, 380-81 (Cal. 1990). Eddy argued that he had believed at the time that he
did not have herpes and had not intended nor expected to transmit the disease. Id. The intentional acts
exclusion of the policy would defeat coverage only if the consensual act of intercourse resulted in an
intended harm, done with a "preconceived design to inflict injury." Id. at 384. Since the issue of Eddy's
subjective intent was a triable issue of material fact for the jury to decide, the court held that, as a matter
of law, the insurer had a duty to defend against the complaint since it could potentially be required to
indemnify for Eddy's negligence. Id. at 381-82.
The capricious nature of the cases dealing with sex crimes is illustrated by California's response
to a similar situation. After Hollywood-star Rock Hudson's death from an AIDS-related illness, his
partner prevailed in a lawsuit for damages in which the jury found that Hudson had concealed his HIV
status and continued to have high-risk sex. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Sheffi, 989 F.2d 1105, 1106 (9th
Cir. 1993). The jury awarded $14,500,000 in compensatory damages. Id. The state administrator sued
Hudson's liability insurer for coverage, but the court held that high-risk sex is an intentional act which is
inherently harmful and therefore uninsurable. Id. at 1109.
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determining coverage, each of which treat the third party complaint in a different
manner. For example, the most common form of coverage assessment considers
"eight corners," consisting of the complaint and the insurance policy.193 With this
approach, the courts are freed of the need to ascertain facts extrinsic to the eight
corners.194 At the other extreme is the approach in which evidence extrinsic to the
eight corners plays a much greater role.'9 5 The breadth of the latter has led to the
tendency of the judiciary to look at liability insurance policies as "litigation
insurance," which has had the effect of forcing insurer participation with little
regard for the intentional acts exclusion.196 Accordingly, California courts have
established a duty to defend when there is a "potential" for coverage.197 As is
always the case, there exist other approaches scattered between these two
extremes.198
For purposes of this article, one related and significant difficulty will be
sidestepped. This is not a trivial oversight. Reliance on the complaint introduces
considerable uncertainty into the equation because a third party might resort to
"artful" pleading simply to bring a deep pocket, in the guise of the insurer, into the
fray. If the plaintiff alleges covered offenses such as misappropriation of trade
19 Ellen S. Pryor, The Tort Liability Regime and the Duty to Defend, 58 MD. L. REv. 1, 23 (1999).
194 Am. Alliance Ins. Co. v. Frito Lay Inc., 788 S.W.2d 152, 153-54 (Tex. App. 1990). Under this
approach, "[t]he duty to defend is not affected by facts ascertained before suit, developed in the process
of litigation, or by the ultimate outcome of the suit." Id. at 154. One commentator has suggested that this
approach is the majority approach, and notes that other states generally applying this standard (albeit by
different names) include Florida, Illinois, Minnesota, New York, Ohio, and Washington among others.
Willy E. Rice, Insurance Contracts and Judicial Discord Over Whether Liability Insurers Must Defend
Insureds' Allegedly Intentional and Immoral Conduct: A Historical and Empirical Review of Federal
and State Courts'Declaratory Judgments-1900-1997, 47 AM. U. L. REv. 1131, 1152-54 (1998).
195 Alaska requires a defense based on facts "known or reasonably ascertainable." Cont'l Ins. Co. v. U.S.
Fid. & Guar. Co., 528 P.2d 430, 434 (Alaska 1974). Indiana similarly examines "the allegations of the
complaint coupled with those facts known to or ascertainable by the insurer after reasonable
investigation." Trisler v. Ind. Ins. Co., 575 N.E.2d 1021, 1023 (Ind. Ct. App. 1991).
196 See Gray v. Zurich, 419 P.2d 168, 176 n.15 (Cal. 1966). Gray held that a "[d]efendant cannot
construct a formal fortress of the third party's pleadings and retreat behind its walls.. . . [C]ourts do not
examine only the pleaded word but the potential liability created by the suit." Id.
19 See, e.g., Montrose Chem. Corp. v. Admiral Ins. Co., 913 P.2d 878 passim (Cal. 1995).
198 Hawkeye-Sec. Ins. Co. v. Clifford, 366 N.W.2d 489, 491 (S.D. 1985) (holding that ambiguous
pleadings do not preclude coverage if it "arguably appears from the face of the pleadings in the action
against the insured that the alleged claim, if true, falls within policy coverage"); Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co.
v. Sunshine Corp., 74 F.3d 685, 688 (6th Cir. 1996) (opining that, notwithstanding the eight corners
rule, a poorly drafted complaint does not necessarily preclude coverage).
ISSN 0041-9915 (print) 1942-8405 (online) * DOI 10.5195/lawreview.2013.297
http://lawreview.law.pitt.edu
UNIVERSITY OF PITTSBURGH LAW REVIEW
PAGE | 754 | VOL. 74 | 2013
secrets, as well as uncovered offenses such as patent infringement, the insurer may
be required to cover defense costs for the entire action.199 Conversely, a third party
might draft the complaint in such a way as to discourage an insurer from coverage,
thereby leaving the would-be insured without an insurer-funded defense.
The artful pleading problem is especially problematic in those jurisdictions
that rely more nearly on the eight corners approach. 200 By excluding extrinsic
evidence of coverage or non-coverage, such jurisdictions depend on a third party's
pleading to an exaggerated extent. 201 While, in my judgment, this cedes too much
power to third parties, my working assumption is that the various approaches for
analyzing the scope of coverage account for the vagaries of pleading and, if they do
not, they are cognizant of the oversight.202
b. The Duty to Defend
A second factor affecting the application of the intentional acts exclusion is
that the exclusion implicates not only the insurer's duty to indemnify but also its
duty to defend. Thus, courts have limited application of the intentional injury
exclusion to an insurer's obligation to indemnify an insured and not to an insurer's
duty to defend.203 Part of the justification for this view lies in the fact that coverage
often is not or cannot be determined until a suit is resolved and thus the duty to
defend must necessarily be much broader than the duty to indemnify.204
' See John Deere Ins. Co. v. Shamrock Indus., Inc., 696 F. Supp. 434, 440 (D. Minn. 1988).
200 In Horace Mann Ins. Co. v. Barbara B., the California Supreme Court dismissed the possibility that
artful pleading would influence the outcome of these kinds of cases. 846 P.2d 792, 799 (Cal. 1993).
Justice Baxter in a concurring opinion and Justice Arabia in a dissenting opinion both voiced skepticism
about this aspect of the opinion. Id. at 801-05.
201 Susan Randall, Redefining The Insurer's Duty to Defend, 3 CONN. INS. L.J. 221, 222-23 (1997) (third
party's lawyer can manipulate coverage); Gregor J. Schwinghammer, Jr., Insurance Litigation in
Florida: Declaratory Judgments and the Duty to Defend, 50 U. MIAMI L. REV. 945, 973-74 (1996)
(insurer is trapped in the "formal fortress" of the third party's complaint).
202 Some courts are quick to ferret out pleadings drafted for the purpose of bringing an insurer into a
dispute. See Linebaugh v. Berdish, 376 N.W.2d 400, 406 (Mich. 1985) (negligence claim in the context
of sexual misconduct was "a transparent attempt to trigger insurance coverage").
203 See Gray v. Zurich, 419 P.2d 168, 176-77 (Cal. 1966) (insurer has a duty to defend insured's
assault).
204 Guy William McRoskey, The Rule in a Contribution Action Between Third-Party Insurers Wherein
the Plaintiff Insurer Seeks Reimbursement of Defense Costs from the Defendant Insurer After a
Collusive Fraud on the PlaintifInsurer Under California Law, 36 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 797, 809 (1999).
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In the past, courts have had difficulty separating an insurer's duty to defend
from its duty to indemnify. Insurers often claim that a duty to defend is contingent
upon a finding that the insurer is bound to indemnify the insured. However, a
determination that there is a duty to indemnify is often not possible at the outset of
a suit because it is often unclear whether a third party claim falls within the
boundaries of the indemnification policy until the suit is concluded. At best, these
kinds of contentions are difficult to resolve.205 In Gray v. Zurich, the court held that
"[s]ince the instant action presented the potentiality of a judgment based upon
nonintentional conduct, and since liability for such conduct would fall within the
indemnification coverage, the duty to defend became manifest at the outset." 206 Of
paramount importance in that case was the duty to defend.
c. Victim Compensation
While the policy underlying the intentional acts exclusion appears to be
straightforward, the application of the public policy rationale is not as simple as it
may seem. This is illustrated by a significant variant of the public policy
rationale-the compensation of victims. Professor James Fischer has framed the
issue clearly, "to the extent tort law retains vestiges of retribution or punishment of
205 The Gray court found that:
the nature of the obligation to defend is itself necessarily uncertain. Although
insurers have often insisted that the duty arises only if the insurer is bound to
indemnify the insured, this very contention creates a dilemma. No one can
determine whether the third party suit does or does not fall within the
indemnification coverage of the policy until that suit is resolved. ... [Thus,
t]he carrier's obligation to indemnify inevitably will not be defined until the
adjudication of the very action which it should have defended. Hence the
policy contains its own seeds of uncertainty; the insurer has held out a
promise that by its very nature is ambiguous.
Gray, 419 P.2d at 171.
206 Id. at 176. Intellectual property infringement also introduces a wrinkle in this context. One
commentator has observed:
[flor most insureds, particularly for intellectual property litigation, the duty to
defend is more important than the duty to indemnify. Many intellectual
property cases settle with little or no money changing hands. The expense of
defending a lawsuit is far greater than the cost of most settlements.
Moreover, by compelling an insurer to defend, an insured may also win the
indemnity battle. Insurers that understand economic reality know that it often
costs less to contribute to settle a case than to defend it.
Richard L. Antognini, What You Need to Know About Intellectual Property Coverage, 31 TORT & INS.
L.J. 895, 901 (1996).
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the tortfeasor as end purposes, indemnification is thought to interfere with the
achievement of' the public policy goals of deterring intentional wrongdoing.207
Professor Fischer argues, however, that "the 'no indemnification' policy rests on
the erroneous assumption that payment in these cases benefits the insured. The
reality is otherwise . . .. Any payment under the policy would go to the victim with
the insurer in turn subrogated to the victim's claim against the insured to the
amount of the payment."208 For example, in Young v. Brown, a Louisiana case
involving the criminally negligent shooting of a man with a shotgun, the court held
that the intentional acts exclusion should not be applied in third party claims.209 In
reaching its decision, the court determined that the traditional public policy
considerations regarding the indemnification of intentional acts should be balanced
against the public policy concern for compensating the victim. Using this analysis,
the court concluded that the welfare of the innocent victim was of greater
importance, and thus, allowed for indemnification in the name of public policy-a
public policy that the court found to trump the policy supporting the intentional
acts exclusion. This view of the public policy justification of the intentional acts
exclusion colors its application in even the simplest of situations.
To be sure, the policy that supports exclusions for intentional acts has had an
uneasy existence. For example, this public policy underpinning is thought to be
inapplicable where punitive damages are imposed for "conduct which is neither
illegal nor intentional."210 While this is an unexceptional proposition, it is also
guided, in part, by the idea that a denial of coverage in many cases is a denial of
compensation to an injured third party. Indeed, some have argued that because the
exclusion operates to the disadvantage of injured third parties, the intentional acts
exclusion should not be applied in the case of third party claims.211 Despite the
207 Fischer, supra note 147, at 111.
20sId.at 111-12.
209 658 So. 2d 750, 753 (La. Ct. App. 1995).
210 John D. Boyle, Insurance Coverage for Punitive Damages and Intentional Conduct in
Massachusetts, 25 NEW ENG. L. REV. 827, 839 (1991) (discussing coverage for these damages outside
the context of the "intentional acts exclusion"). The court in Dykstra v. Foremost Ins. Co. wrote,
"[s]ince insurance is designed to protect against contingent or unknown risks of harm, rather than harm
that is certain or expected, it is well settled that intentional or fraudulent acts are deemed purposeful
rather than accidental and, therefore, are not covered under a [commercial general liability] policy." 17
Cal. Rptr. 2d 543, 545 (Cal. Ct. App. 1993) (citations omitted); see McRoskey, supra note 206, at 869.
211 Rice, supra note 196. Professor Rice asserts that courts often allow their biases toward certain classes
of victims to influence their judgments, and that too many victims go uncompensated for their injuries
because couits declare the insurer has no duty to defend. Id. at 1136. He proposes legislation that
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uncertain landscape in which the intentional injury exclusion is applied, however, it
is certain that the doctrine is firmly entrenched in insurance law. While the
difficulty in actual application of the doctrine is well chronicled, there is no
significant movement to second-guess the policy underlying this doctrine.
5. Moral Hazard
The role of moral hazard in insurance law, at least for purposes of this article,
is an attenuated one. Moral hazard as expressed in this context refers to the danger
that the very availability of insurance effectively increases the risk that the peril
insured against will occur.212 This phenomenon is easiest to see in the case of
liability or third-party insurance. The fact that the losses occasioned by my
negligent driving can be offset by liability insurance may very well encourage me
to take more risks. Still, as is developed below, the effect of moral hazard is such
that the encouragement of risky behavior is often offset by other considerations.2 13
This is true in first-party insurance relationships and is likely true in many third-
party relationships.
In the case of first-party insurance, the existence of earthquake coverage on
my personal residence does not change my behavior because I have no meaningful
way to alter the outcome of my bargain. The role of moral hazard in this context is
de minimis. Similarly, while malpractice insurance is available to shield me from
my legal missteps, I am more motivated to do good legal work by the desire to
maintain a good reputation and my desire to do the best legal work that I can do for
my clients. In this case, while I can meaningfully alter the outcome of my bargain,
there are significant countervailing considerations that outweigh any attraction in
taking chances. In neither of these cases am I tempted to take more risk because of
the existence of insurance. 214
requires insurers to defend policyholders even when a third party complaint alleges an intentional act.
Id. at 1218.
212 Baker, supra note 87, at 238 ("What moral hazard means is that, if you cushion the consequences of
bad behavior, then you encourage that bad behavior."); Jacob Loshin, Insurance Law's Hapless
Busybody: A Case Against the Insurable Interest Requirement, 117 YALE L.J. 474, 480-81 (2007)
(moral hazard refers to insured's lax care for property insured against loss).
213 I grant that this overstates the case. Professor Tom Baker may well have captured the essence of the
concern with his pithy comment "people behave differently when they bear the costs of their misfortune
than when they do not." Baker, supra note 34, at 45. My point is that good behavior can often be
attributed to costs apart from the insurance context.
214 Baker, supra note 87, at 279 (for insurance to reduce care, insureds must be capable of modifying
relevant behavior).
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While I concede that an insured can affect the insurance bargain under the
guise of moral hazard, the main point of focus is not the moral hazard itself but
rather that the insured has the ability to affect the bargain.215 In this respect, moral
hazard introduces nothing new. Additionally, to the extent that the availability of
insurance creates a cognizable moral hazard, this encouragement of risky behavior,
if it exists, can be taken into account by insurers. That is, it can be part of the
calculus that an insurer considers in accepting a class of risk.216 This being the case,
it follows that moral hazard plays no significant role in the view of the insurance
bargain taken by this article.
CONCLUSION
This article begins with a simple premise. Insurance policies are unique
contracts that deal with the commodity of risk. An insured, to be sure, is subject to
a great many constraints in striking the insurance bargain. The bargain is one of
adhesion and the policy itself is rife with terms with which even sophisticated
parties cannot tinker. Within this bargain, however, the insured is nonetheless
bound by the contract doctrine that calls for a party not to do anything that would
interfere with the other party's ability to obtain the benefit of that bargain.
As demonstrated above, the insured's ability to alter the risk calculus made by
the insurer should, as a matter of contract law, have consequences. Several
insurance law doctrines can be traced to these contract law fundamentals and can,
indeed, be readily explained by reference to these fundamentals without much
manipulation. While insurance law can be impenetrable, impenetrability is not an
impediment to basic understanding of doctrine and the application of these
doctrines in a common-sense way. Thus, a return to fundamentals is a useful
exercise to make insurance doctrine comprehensible to a broader audience.
215 As Professor Abraham observes, the insured's advantage over an insurer in this regard is the result of
the asymmetric allocation of information to the insured. ABRAHAM, supra note 35, at 35. One
commentator suggests that one of the foci of moral hazard is not an orientation to individuals, but rather
a matter which creates societal incentives which affect the insurance bargain. Deborah A. Stone, Moral
Hazard: Insurance as Moral Opportunity, 6 CONN. INS. L.J. 11, 13 (1999).
216 Baker, supra note 87, at 250 (insurers can weed out bad actors).
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